Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...
Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...
Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...
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ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD WAR II<br />
ing another difficulty—a shortage <strong>of</strong> ammunition—that in early<br />
1944 forced the Germans <strong>to</strong> restrict their firing. Another ammunition<br />
shortage occurred in November 1944 and was attributed<br />
<strong>to</strong> the bombing <strong>of</strong> German chemical plants and transportation.<br />
One consequence <strong>of</strong> this shortage was that some<br />
German shells were filled with inert materials. By the end <strong>of</strong><br />
the war, flak units could deliver only one-half <strong>of</strong> their firepower<br />
potential because <strong>of</strong> these shortages. Another indication <strong>of</strong> the<br />
decline <strong>of</strong> efficiency <strong>of</strong> German flak was the increasing number<br />
<strong>of</strong> shells required <strong>to</strong> down an Allied aircraft. In the first 20<br />
months <strong>of</strong> the war, it <strong>to</strong>ok 2,800 heavy flak rounds per kill,<br />
whereas in 1944, 16,000 flak rounds <strong>of</strong> 88 mm/model 36-37<br />
or 3,000 rounds <strong>of</strong> 128 mm caliber rounds were required. 72<br />
Nevertheless, German flak was effective in World War II and<br />
grew increasingly potent as the war continued (fig. 26). Through<br />
1944 German gunners inflicted about one-third <strong>of</strong> Allied aircraft<br />
losses and two-thirds <strong>of</strong> the damage; and after that, they<br />
inflicted about two-thirds <strong>of</strong> the losses and almost all <strong>of</strong> the<br />
damage. To be precise, not only did German flak become more<br />
effective through the course <strong>of</strong> the war but proportionally<br />
more important as German aircraft were swept from the skies.<br />
In June 1944, for example, the Germans deployed 10,900<br />
heavy and 22,200 light guns in the west. The AAF lost 18,418<br />
aircraft in combat against Germany in World War II (fig. 27). The<br />
American <strong>Air</strong>men credited AAA with downing 7,821 <strong>of</strong> these<br />
and enemy aircraft with 6,800. 73<br />
In addition <strong>to</strong> downing and damaging Allied aircraft, flak also<br />
degraded bombing accuracy. A 1941 British report estimated<br />
that one-third <strong>of</strong> bombing accuracy degradation was attributed<br />
<strong>to</strong> flak. A postwar study <strong>of</strong> Eighth <strong>Air</strong> Force bombing errors between<br />
May 1944 and February 1945 credits almost 40 percent<br />
<strong>of</strong> these errors <strong>to</strong> enemy guns. An additional 22 percent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
error was attributed <strong>to</strong> the increased altitude required <strong>to</strong> counter<br />
flak. The Mediterranean air forces put the same message across<br />
in another way: with little or no flak opposition, fighters required<br />
30 bombs <strong>to</strong> hit a bridge, but against intense flak, it <strong>to</strong>ok 150<br />
bombs per hit. Medium bombers not encountering flak destroyed<br />
21 percent <strong>of</strong> the bridges attacked and completely<br />
41