Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF
miles between the Falkland Islands and Britain, relieved only
by the spare, American-operated base on Ascension Island. The
British had only two small carriers available to support the
campaign. (The British planned to reduce even this small force.
Thus, had the Argentines delayed their action, British difficulties
would have multiplied.) Their small decks forced the British to
rely for air superiority on a handful of Harriers, an aircraft neither
designed nor equipped for such a role. British ship designs
also proved flawed in that damage-control systems were inadequate,
and some of the ships lacked armored cables. Initially,
only two ships in the invasion fleet carried modern missiles
(Seawolf) for defense against low-level attacks.
Combat revealed the biggest British problem to be the lack
of early warning aircraft. Although the British brilliantly and
rapidly improvised to make good other serious deficiencies
(such as adapting the land-based Harrier GR3 to operate off
aircraft carriers, expanding air-to-air refueling capabilities,
mating the Sidewinder to the Harrier, and installing ECM
aboard the Vulcan), this one glaring gap remained. In addition,
the inadequacy of early warning proved costly to the
British. In short, the British entered the conflict ill prepared. 34
British authorities claimed the destruction of 72 aircraft in
the air, not an unreasonable number when compared with the
Argentine admission of 36 pilots killed in the campaign on 505
sorties. They believe that the Harriers downed 20 aircraft;
small arms, as many as six; and naval 4.5-inch guns, one.
Forty-five aircraft fell to various surface-to-air missiles. 35
As usual, these numbers are probably overstated. Secondary
accounts based on Argentine documents and interviews put
total Argentine air losses between 44 and 55. The most detailed
account, based upon Argentine sources, puts the losses to the
Harriers at 21; to SAMs, 18; AAA, 3 (fig. 73); and friendly fire,
to at least two. 36
The official British account credits the Blowpipe with destroying
nine Argentine aircraft, while other authors say the true
number is from two to four. The troops who carried the 47-pound
Blowpipe across the difficult Falklands’ terrain criticized its
weight. This is understandable under the circumstances, but the
missile did give the troops some protection against Argentine
164