Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SINCE 1990
“one shot, one hit” accuracy, which meant that a few aircraft
could exact significant damage on the defender. Great fleets of
attack and support aircraft were no longer needed to inflict
critical damage on an opponent. 10
The coalition had significant intelligence advantages. Certainly,
the American fleet of sophisticated photographic, infrared,
and electronic surveillance satellites was crucial. Airborne
platforms added to this capability. In addition, the
coalition contacted and received information from the companies
that had built and installed equipment in potential targets.
The Airmen also utilized agents on the ground. 11 On the other
side, the Iraqis had a good idea of US reconnaissance capabilities
because of US intelligence assistance to the Iraqis during
the Iran-Iraq War. Therefore, they employed various methods
to deny US overhead capabilities. In the end, however, seldom
has one force so well informed fought another so ill informed.
Perhaps the greatest advantage the coalition forces had over
the Iraqis was in the quality of personnel. The allied airmen were
competent and highly trained. Not only did they have more flying
experience than their opponents, but also many (certainly
from the NATO forces) had trained in the highly realistic flag
exercises. Even had the two combatants exchanged equipment,
the coalition would have won—albeit at a greater cost.
The coalition planned to use its overwhelming air power to
simultaneously attack both air defense and strategic targets. 12
The initial plan called for the F-117s to attack key air defense
centers, cruise missiles to hit the electric power grid, along with
attacks on command and communications facilities. These assaults
would be followed by flights of American F-14 and F-15
fighters to counter any Iraqi interceptors. Later, massive coalition
air attacks supported by drones, jammers, and aircraft equipped
with radar-homing missiles would overload, neutralize, and
destroy the Iraqi air defense system. 13
The strategic plan called for a four-phase operation to achieve
the coalition’s military and political goals. The Airmen’s target
list grew from 84 in August 1990 (Instant Thunder) to 481 by the
start of the shooting on 15 January 1991. At the same time, the
number of targets in the target set “Strategic Air Defense” grew
from 10 to 56, and those in “Airfields” grew from 7 to 31. 14
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