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Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD WAR II<br />

tracted from his primary job. Flak defenses also decreased<br />

bombing accuracy. The best measure, therefore, is the cost (effort<br />

and losses) required <strong>to</strong> put bombs on target.<br />

A sixth and final lesson <strong>of</strong> the war concerned the difficulty<br />

<strong>of</strong> correctly identifying aircraft: the gunners never were able <strong>to</strong><br />

adequately sort out the friendlies from the foes. Not only did<br />

friendly fire down friendly aircraft—most dramatically demonstrated<br />

by the loss <strong>of</strong> Allied troop carriers over Sicily in July<br />

1943 and German fighters on 1 January 1945—but also frequently,<br />

friendly fire did not engage hostile aircraft. Despite<br />

electronic equipment, codes, procedures, briefings, and restricted<br />

zones, the problem persisted and accidents happened.<br />

The end <strong>of</strong> the war brought two other developments that<br />

seemed <strong>to</strong> override these advantages gained by the defense.<br />

The first was jet propulsion that greatly increased aircraft performance,<br />

further complicating the defender’s task. The other<br />

was the a<strong>to</strong>mic bomb that extended the prospect that one aircraft<br />

and one bomb could destroy one city, which was very different<br />

from the massive formations <strong>of</strong> hundreds <strong>of</strong> aircraft returning<br />

day after day. This development overturned the<br />

attritional concept <strong>of</strong> defense that dominated the air war. This,<br />

then, was the air defense situation in the immediate post–World<br />

War II era.<br />

Notes<br />

1. Edward Westermann, Flak: German Anti-<strong>Air</strong>craft Defenses 1914–1945<br />

(Lawrence, Kans.: University Press, 2001), 9.<br />

2. Ibid., 10–16.<br />

3. The Germans fielded almost 2,800 antiaircraft guns at the end <strong>of</strong> the war<br />

with 30 percent geared for homeland defense. See P. T. Cullen, “<strong>Air</strong> Defense <strong>of</strong><br />

London, Paris, and Western Germany” (paper, <strong>Air</strong> Corps Tactical School,<br />

Maxwell Field, Alabama, n.d.), 7, 9, 28, 99, table 5, <strong>Air</strong> Force His<strong>to</strong>rical Research<br />

Agency (HRA), Maxwell <strong>Air</strong> Force Base (AFB), Ala.; “Antiaircraft Defences<br />

<strong>of</strong> Great Britain: 1914 <strong>to</strong> 1946,” appendix A, Royal Artillery Institute (RAI),<br />

Woolwick, United Kingdom; “Antiaircraft Gun Trends and Scientific and Technical<br />

Projection: Eurasian Communist Countries,” July 1981, 1–1; N.W.<br />

Routledge, His<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>of</strong> the Royal Regiment <strong>of</strong> Artillery: Anti-<strong>Air</strong>craft Artillery,<br />

1914–55 (London: Brassey’s, 1994), 22; and Westermann, Flak, 26.<br />

4. Westermann, Flak, 27.<br />

5. Another source lists the rounds per claim as United States, 1,055;<br />

British, 1,800; and French, 3,225. See Ian Hogg, Anti-<strong>Air</strong>craft: A His<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>of</strong><br />

59

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