Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

Chapter 3
Airmen versus Guerrillas: Vietnam
The Vietnam conflict was another war that pitted Western
armies and high-technology arms against numerous tenacious
foes in primitive terrain. The technology brought with it
many advantages, the most significant of which were firepower
and mobility. Air power was the most important and visible
manifestation of this technology. In response, the guerrillas
relied on dispersion, camouflage, mobility, and night operations
to neutralize the impact of air power, airfield attack, and
ground-based weapons to directly defend themselves.
French Operations
Compared to the later American involvement in Indochina,
the French conducted smaller military operations with lessmodern
equipment. One compensating factor was that initially
the Communists offered little direct defense against air attack,
not fielding their first antiaircraft opposition until January
1950. 1 During the decisive 1954 battle of Dien Bien Phu, the
French had only 107 World War II–vintage combat aircraft
(fighters, fighter bombers, and bombers). Here, the French attempted
to duplicate their 1953 success at Na San, where they
used some of their best troops to lure the guerrillas into the
open to be cut down by air and artillery fire.
The Vietminh, however, learned the lessons from their previous
defeats and increased their antiaircraft protection. The
Communist AAA forced French aircraft, which had initially
flown at 600 to 1,800 feet, to fly at 2,700 to 3,000 feet, which
decreased French effectiveness. The guns also took a toll on
French aircraft. During attacks on the Vietminh supply lines,
for two weeks after 24 November 1953, Communist AAA hit 45
of 51 French aircraft and downed two. Not surprisingly, flak and
air power played a vital role in the actual siege. The Communists
opened the battle by attacking French airfields throughout
Indochina with artillery and infiltrators and damaged a
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