Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF
fore moving on to the next major conflict. Ground-based air
defenses played varying roles in the Iran-Iraq War, the invasion
of Grenada, and the Afghan-Soviet War.
The war between Iran and Iraq was the bloodiest conflict
since the Korean War. Both countries had considerable quantities
of relatively modern aircraft and air defense equipment:
the Iranians using American aircraft and British and American
missiles (Hawk, Rapier, and Tigercat); and the Iraqis relying on
Soviet equipment, including 70 SAM batteries (SA-2s, SA-3s,
and a few SA-6s). Reportedly, both sides lost about 150 aircraft
by the end of 1981, with most of the combat losses to ground
weapons. Neither side made effective use of SAMs, but manportable
SAMs did have a major impact on the air war. While
registering few hits, perhaps one for every 20 to 30 fired, the
missiles forced attacking aircraft higher and thus degraded
their effectiveness. The inability of either side to make good use
of modern technology stems from problems with parts, maintenance,
and training. In addition, the main objective of both
air forces apparently was to avoid attrition and defeat and to
deter attacks. The lessons of this conflict therefore may be that
modern equipment does not automatically make modern forces
and that air forces without access to secure support and resupply
may adopt a defensive strategy to preserve their forces. 43
In contrast to the long and costly Iran-Iraq War, US action
in Grenada was short and cheap. The 1984 invasion will probably
best be remembered for its nonmilitary aspects; nevertheless,
air power played a significant role in the short, one-sided
operation. The United States faced neither hostile aircraft nor
any heavy antiaircraft weapons (greater than 23 mm), only
small arms and 24 ZSU-23 guns, lacking radar guidance. Despite
this imbalance, the defenders downed four helicopters (a
fifth was destroyed after colliding with a damaged helicopter)
and severely damaged at least four others (fig. 77). The loss of
so many machines against such minor resistance here and in
the 1975 Mayaguez incident, during which eight of nine helicopters
employed were disabled, again raised the question of
helicopter survival in combat operations. 44
Finally, in recent years guerrilla groups have claimed success
against aircraft. Although it is difficult to separate insurgents’
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