Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Riverside, 1989), 148; Stryker, “A Bureaucratic Politics Examination,” 229;
and Walker, Martin, and Watkins, Strategic Defense, 33, 38.
40. Baucom, Origins of SDI, 43; and Bowman, “The 1969 ABM Debate,”
173, 177.
41. The SALT I agreement gave the Soviets a numerical edge with both
ICBMs (1,618 to 1,054) and submarine-launched strategic missiles (62 boats
and 950 missiles to 44 boats and 710 missiles). See Baucom, Origins of SDI,
51–71; and Longstreth and Pike, A Report on the Impact, 4.
42. Baucom, Origins of SDI, 70; Grogan, “Power Play” (May 1998), 11;
and L. Maust, G. W. Goodman, and C. E. McLain, “History of Strategic Defense,”
System Planning Corporation (SPC) final report, SPC 742, September
1981, 16–17.
43. Walker, Martin, and Watkins, Strategic Defense, 38; Bradley Graham,
Hit to Kill: The New Battle over Shielding America from Missile Attack (N.Y.:
Public Affairs, 2001), 12; and Eisendrath, Goodman, and Marsh, The Phantom
Defense, 7.
44. The radar was about one-tenth the size of the SAFEGUARD system
and the missile one-fourth the size of the Sprint.
45. It consisted of randomly moving the ICBMs and decoys between the
shelters so that an attacker would have to target all 4,600 shelters to take
out the 200 strategic missiles. The Air Force opposed such a system, but in
the interest of maintaining military solidarity, muted its views. See Desmond
Ball, “US Strategic Concepts and Programs: The Historical Context,” in Wells
and Litwak, eds., Strategic Defenses, 25; Baucom, Origins of SDI, 95, 172–73;
and Douglas Johnston, “Ballistic Missile Defense: Panacea or Pandora?”
(PhD diss., Harvard University, 1982), 54.
46. Air Force Magazine, May 1999, 150; and Office of Technology Assessment,
MX Missile Basing (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981), 5–6, 17, 125.
47. Reiss, The Strategic Defense Initiative, 56.
48. The BMD system was renamed SENTRY in 1982. See Reiss, The
Strategic Defense Initiative, 57; and Walker, Martin, and Watkins, Strategic
Defense, 43.
49. The key source on SDI is Baucom, Origins of SDI.
50. Kerry Hunter, “The Reign of Fantasy: A Better Explanation for the
Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative” (PhD diss., University of Washington,
1989), 182–84.
51. Ibid., 91–95, 142.
52. The major US concern was that the Soviets could convert their advantage
of heavier missile throw weight into many more maneuvering warheads
and move toward strategic superiority. See Baucom, Origins of SDI, 77–85.
53. David Dennon, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Post-Cold War Era
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 97; William Kincade, “The SDI and Arms
Control,” in Wells and Litwak, Strategic Defenses, 102; and Roberto Zuazua,
“The Strategic Defense Initiative: An Examination on the Impact of Constructing
a Defensive System to Protect the United States from Nuclear Ballistic
Missiles” (MA thesis, Southwest Texas State University, 1988), 28.
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