Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SINCE 1990
AAA at the airmen but were able to down only one F-117 and
one F-16. However, the loss of the F-117 was shocking, as none
had been hit, much less lost, in the Gulf War. The cause of loss
was not made public, but it was probably due to an SA-3. Nevertheless,
the aircraft loss rate was less than that of the Gulf
War. However, the loss of 15 UAVs by one account (25 UAVs by
another) and three to five percent of the sorties indicates both
their vulnerability and, in fact, why they were employed. 41
The Serbs learned from the Iraqi experience. On only a few
occasions did they directly confront allied forces; instead, they
attempted to preserve their air defense system as a force in
being. They were successful, as Serbs were firing as many SAMs
at allied aircraft on the last days of the operation as on the
first. Thus, the Airmen had to maintain high levels of support
aircraft and operate from higher altitudes (above 15,000 feet)
throughout the campaign, unlike the action in Iraq where both
altitude and support sorties declined later in the operation
after the air defenses had been suppressed. 42
The United States responded to the 11 September 2001 attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with an assault
on the terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan as well as the
government of Afghanistan that protected them. On 7 October,
US air strikes hit command and control, air defense, and airfields
in Afghanistan. Compared to the operations against Iraq
and Serbia, the opposition was weaker and American capabilities
greater. The American Airmen used not only the equipment that
proved so successful against Iraq but such new equipment as
the B-1 and B-2 bombers, UAVs, and munitions: wind-corrected
munitions dispenser, joint direct attack munition, and GPSguided
bombs. Neither the terrorists nor the Afghans had much
of an air defense. In the one-sided conflict, American Airmen lost
three aircraft in accidents and two of three UAVs to icing but
none to enemy causes. Against this minimal resistance, the principal
problem was that of distinguishing the correct target. 43
A year and a half later, Iraq was the site of another swift war.
On 21 March 2003, coalition air forces began air strikes on
Iraq. Iraqi air defenses were significantly weaker than they
were in the first Gulf War, consisting of 325 combat aircraft
and 210 large SAMs. Coalition air forces were also smaller in
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