Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

FROM GUNS TO MISSILES
a large area along the front without artillery support for eight
to 45 minutes during the air strike. Following a meeting between
the two services in July 1952, the Army eased the restriction on
artillery fire to a minimum time, although it retained prohibitions
on the use of proximity-fuzed and high-angle fire when aircraft
were in the area. The Airmen now believed that the danger from
enemy guns exceeded the danger from friendly guns.
In their next step, the Americans actively engaged the flak.
On 6 August 1952, the Air Force and Army produced a plan
named SUPPRESS, which set out procedures to neutralize
suspected and known antiaircraft positions. While retaining the
July artillery restrictions, SUPPRESS permitted the fighterbomber
pilots either to accept or to reject artillery support. The
gunners would hit suspected positions with proximity-fuzed
fire before the strike and then signal the end of proximity-fuzed
fire with a radio call and a white phosphorous or colored smoke
round. The artillery would continue the bombardment with
impact-fuzed ammunition. During a one-month experiment
(25 September 1952 through 25 October 1952) with these procedures
in IX Corps, the USAF lost only one aircraft on 1,816
CAS sorties, compared with planning figures of one loss for
every 380 CAS sorties. (Army artillery fired 679,000 rounds in
connection with the air strikes.) This marked decline in aircraft
losses came despite the tripling of Communist flak guns
in the area facing the IX Corps.
The Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force adopted the policy that
became effective on 2 December 1952. Under the slightly
modified procedures, a light aircraft (T-6 Mosquito) led the
fighter-bombers into the area, marked the target, and after the
fighter-bomber pilots identified the target, called in artillery
fire. Friendly artillery would hit all known enemy antiaircraft
guns within 2,500 yards of the target first with proximityfuzed
shells and finally with a white phosphorous or colored
smoke round. The barrage continued with impact-fuzed shells
for three minutes, as the aircraft attacked. Despite such problems
as fighter-bomber pilots not always being ready to exploit
the suppression fire and increased numbers of Communist
flak guns, fighter-bomber losses remained acceptable. CAS sorties
per fighter-bomber loss rose from 917 in December 1952
79