Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS
Nebraska, 1983), 77; and CNA, “Summary of Air Ops in SEA: January
72–January 73,” 4-1, 4-8, 4-19, 4-23.
40. Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown
and Co., 1974), 412; Clodfelter, “By Other Means,” 105, 111; W. Hays Parks,
“Linebacker and the Law of War,” Air University Review 34 (January–February
1983): 16; and Nixon, RN: The Memoirs, 734.
41. Broughton, Thud Ridge, 36.
42. Briefing Books IV, Headquarters US Air Force, details on the Linebacker
II missions, 2 vols., December 1972, HRA.
43. Norman Polmar, ed., Strategic Air Command—People, Aircraft, and
Missiles (Annapolis: Nautical & Aviation, 1979), 126; Granville, “Summary of
USAF Aircraft Losses,” 18; James McCarthy and George Allison, Linebacker
II—A View from the Rock (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Power Research Institute,
1979), 12; and Karl Eschmann, “The Role of Tactical Air Support: Linebacker
II” (thesis, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1985),
70–72, AUL.
44. “The Role of Tactical Support,” 49, 70–72; and McCarthy and Allison,
Linebacker II, 86. On these first three missions, 1.6 percent of the Ds and
4.9 percent of the Gs went down per sortie. In the entire 11-day campaign,
the Ds suffered 1.8 percent and the Gs, 2.7 percent. About 10 percent of the
missiles fired against the Gs impacted, whereas only 3 percent of those fired
against the Ds impacted. See Headquarters US Air Force, briefing books, December
1972; briefing, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, “Operations Analysis:
Linebacker II Air Operations,” 31 January 1973, HRA; McCarthy and Allison,
Linebacker II, 70; and Eschmann, “The Role of Tactical Air Support,” 49.
45. This policy quickly changed beginning with the second wave on the
second day. See McCarthy and Allison, Linebacker II, 46–47.
46. Robert Clement, “A Fourth of July in December: A B-52 Navigator’s
Perspective of Linebacker II” (thesis, Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1984), 18, 49, AUL; and McCarthy and Allison, Linebacker
II, 30, 32.
47. Headquarters USAF, “Linebacker USAF Bombing Survey,” 1973, 35,
HRA; TAC, “SEA Tactics Review Brochure,” 11, 77; and Eschmann, “The Role
of Tactical Support,” 60.
48. Eschmann, “The Role of Tactical Support,” 60, 63; and Clodfelter, “By
Other Means,” 121.
49. TAC, “SEA Tactics Review Brochure,” 11, 76.
50. Strategic Air Command (SAC) Briefing, subject: Chaff Effectiveness
in Support of Linebacker II Operations, March 1973, HRA.
51. TAC, “SEA Tactics Review Brochure,” 11, 76.
52. “The Battle for the Skies over North Vietnam: 1964–1972,” 94, HRA.
53. SAC, “Chaff Effectiveness,” March 1973; and TAC, “SEA Tactics Review
Brochure,” 11, 76.
54. SAC, “Chaff Effectiveness,” March 1973. For a general discussion of the
changes, also see Clement, “A Fourth of July in December,” 49; Eschmann,
“The Role of Tactical Air Support,” 75–76; McCarthy and Allison, Linebacker II,
144