Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SINCE 1990
20. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 113–14; GWAPS, vol. 2, Operations
and Effects and Effectiveness, 132; and GWAPS, vol. 4, Weapons,
Tactics, and Training, 102–3. The decoys could fly as fast as 550 knots, as
far as 450 nautical miles, and as high as 40,000 feet for about an hour but
not at the same time. See Cordesman and Wagner, The Gulf War, 413.
21. Barlow, “Command, Control, and Communications,” 149; Thomas
Christie, John Donis, and Alfred Victor, “Desert Shield/Desert Storm Suppression
of Enemy Air Defenses,” Phase I report, IDA Document D-1076,
January 1996, 4, HRA; and Glosson interview, 6 March 1991, 8, HRA.
22. Cordesman and Wagner, The Gulf War, 427; Marine lieutenant general
Royal Moore cited in Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson, A League of Airmen,
179, note 46; and Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress,
April 1992, 129, 218.
23. GWAPS, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training, 92–93; and GWAPS,
vol. 5, A Statistical Compendium, 339, 641.
24. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute, 1991), 166; and GWAPS, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and
Training, 94.
25. GWAPS, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training, 94–96.
26. Ibid., 96–97.
27. Ibid., 104.
28. “AGM-88 HARM,” Air Force Magazine, May 2000, 156.
29. Christie, Donis, Victor, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, II-4; Glosson interview,
March 1991; Lt Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner interview, 4 March
1992, 55, HRA; Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen, Revolution in Warfare?: Air
Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute, 1995), 195; GWAPS,
vol. 2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, 133; and GWAPS, vol. 5, Statistical
Compendium, 550–53.
30. GWAPS, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training, 114; and Stan Morse,
ed., Gulf Air War Debrief (London: Aerospace, 1991), 154–57.
31. “Airborne Electronic Combat in the Gulf War,” n.d., 2, HRA.
32. Later in the campaign, Horner lowered this altitude to 10,000 feet and
then to 8,000 feet.
33. This accuracy is measured in circular error probable, with one-half
of the bombs falling within that radius.
34. William Andrews, Airpower against an Army: Challenge and Response in
CENTAF’s Duel with the Republican Guard, CADRE Paper (Maxwell AFB,
Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 35; Atkinson, Crusade, 101–2; GWAPS, vol.
2, Operations and Effects and Effectiveness, 99; GWAPS, vol. 4, Weapons,
Tactics, and Training, 51; Edward Marolda and Robert Schneller, Shield and
Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.:
Naval Historical Center, 1998), 183, 194; and Winnefeld, Niblack, and Johnson,
A League of Airmen, 127.
35. Friedman, Desert Victory,164.
36. In addition, US forces lost 13 aircraft, and the allies lost five aircraft
to noncombat causes. See Keaney and Cohen, Revolution in Warfare?, 196;
235