Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF economy, speed, and maneuverability), and US restrictions on ECM sales left the IAF in a serious bind. The result was that “The IAF could go anywhere except near the Golan Heights and the Suez fronts, where it was needed most. As they had begun to do three years earlier, the Soviet missiles successfully redefined the nature of modern war.” 11 In response, Israeli improvisation was speedy and effective, yet costly. The IAF used a variety of means to deal with the SAM threat. To defeat heat-seeking missiles, it employed violent maneuvers, turning toward the missile to present the IR seeker a “cold side,” and maneuvering aircraft to cross in the sky creating a “hot spot.” In addition, Israeli airmen dropped flares, even jettisoned fuel, and then ignited it to decoy the heat-seeking missiles. Spotters in helicopters warned pilots of missile launches. The IAF also used chaff, first carried in speed brakes, later in a more conventional manner; improved American ECM pods; and standoff jammers operating from the ground, helicopters, and transports. In addition, the Israelis directly assaulted the SA-6s. The SA-6’s low initial trajectory encouraged the IAF to dive-bomb the SAMs from very steep angles—desperate measures improvised for a desperate situation. The IAF also fired Shrike antiradiation missiles. 12 The Israelis turned around the air war and to a degree the ground action by taking out the Arab SAMs. Concentrating first on the Syrians, the IAF destroyed half of their SAMs in four days. Another factor that aided the IAF was that the Syrians ran out of SA-6s. One source claims that the Israelis knocked out a Syrian control center that seriously hampered the Syrian missile defenses. The Syrians were defeated, and only political restraints prevented a much greater Israeli victory. 13 The solution to the IAF’s problem on the Egyptian front came from an unexpected source, the Israeli army. The Egyptians made one major thrust from their formidable position along the canal, venturing outside of their protective antiaircraft cover, and suffering a decisive defeat on 14 October in the largest tank battle since World War II. The Israelis quickly followed up their tactical victory. In the early morning of 16 October, Israeli forces crossed the canal and in short order created havoc in 153
OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF the Egyptian army. By midday, the Israelis had destroyed four SAM sites, and by the next morning, the IAF was operating in full support of the ground forces. In reverse of the accepted practice, the army made it possible for the air force to operate. According to one account, an Israeli armored division destroyed 34 missile batteries, about one-half of the Egyptian SAMs defending the canal. The Israelis now had the initiative and easily could have inflicted an overwhelming defeat on the Egyptians. But, the major powers intervened, which led to a cease-fire on 22 October. The Israelis won the war and in the process destroyed approximately 40 of the 55–60 SAM batteries that the Egyptians had in action. This destruction was inflicted by the IAF, as well as by Israeli ground forces. 14 Nevertheless, the ground-based air defenses took a substantial toll. Secondary sources state that the Arabs lost 40 to 75 aircraft (one or two dozen to Hawks) and the Israelis perhaps 82 to 100 to SAMs and flak. 15 A US Army study put the total number of Israeli losses at 109, 81 to ground-based air defenses. The study credits AAA with 31 aircraft, SAMs (other than SA-7) 40, SA-7s 4, and a combination of SAMs and AAA 6. Of the 516 Arab aircraft losses, the study attributed 36 to ground weapons, 42 to 20 mm guns, and 23 to Hawks. 16 The ground defenses also claimed a number of friendly aircraft. Israeli gunners apparently downed two of their own aircraft, which probably were Mirages mistaken for the same type aircraft the Egyptians received from the Libyans. The Arabs destroyed 45 to 60 of their own aircraft. On 8 October, for example, Syrian SAMs destroyed 20 Iraqi MiGs, while Egyptian SA-6s may have downed 40 Egyptian aircraft. Thus, Arab SAMs destroyed more Arab aircraft (45–58) than Israeli aircraft (39–44). This “friendly fire” accounted for about 10 to 12 percent of total Arab losses. 17 Helicopters again proved vulnerable. Israeli air and ground defenses devastated an Egyptian commando strike on the first day of the war, downing 20–35 of approximately 50 Mi-8 helicopters. An Egyptian attack on the critical Israeli canal bridge on 18 October ended with all five helicopters downed. On the Arab side, SA-7s claimed six IAF rotary-wing aircraft. 18 154
Page 2 and 3:
Report Documentation Page Form Appr
Page 4 and 5:
Air University Library Cataloging D
Page 6 and 7:
Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER .
Page 8 and 9:
CONTENTS Chapter Page 7 BALLISTIC M
Page 10 and 11:
CONTENTS Figure Page 30 George Pred
Page 12 and 13:
CONTENTS Figure Page 70 Blowpipe .
Page 14 and 15:
Foreword Dr. Kenneth Werrell’s hi
Page 16 and 17:
About the Author Dr. Kenneth P. Wer
Page 18 and 19:
PREFACE excluded from the original
Page 20 and 21:
PREFACE always been a factor in air
Page 22 and 23:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Artillery Institute
Page 24 and 25:
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD
Page 26 and 27:
Page 28 and 29:
Page 30 and 31:
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Figure 7. British 40 mm light antia
Page 36 and 37:
Page 38 and 39:
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES American air
Page 94 and 95:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES company deliv
Page 96 and 97:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES (discussed la
Page 98 and 99:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES flak rockets
Page 100 and 101:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES 1953, the rat
Page 102 and 103:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES to 1,285 in J
Page 104 and 105:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 40. Ar
Page 106 and 107:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES cember 1958,
Page 108 and 109:
Figure 42. Nike Hercules. The Nike
Page 110 and 111:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Airmen test-f
Page 112 and 113:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Bomarc failed
Page 114 and 115:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Despite knowl
Page 116 and 117:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 47. Ha
Page 118 and 119:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Army decided
Page 120 and 121:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES The third fam
Page 122 and 123:
FROM GUNS TO MISSILES with both les
Page 124 and 125: FROM GUNS TO MISSILES that fired ov
Page 126 and 127: FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 53. Br
Page 128 and 129: FROM GUNS TO MISSILES The two-decad
Page 130 and 131: FROM GUNS TO MISSILES A. H. Peterso
Page 132 and 133: FROM GUNS TO MISSILES “SAMs Spur
Page 134 and 135: Chapter 3 Airmen versus Guerrillas:
Page 136 and 137: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS the next y
Page 138 and 139: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS war with t
Page 140 and 141: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS Figure 56.
Page 142 and 143: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS firings fr
Page 146 and 147: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS and Navy c
Page 148 and 149: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS American A
Page 154 and 155: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS but modifi
Page 156 and 157: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS In all, du
Page 158 and 159: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS least an e
Page 162 and 163: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS War Vietna
Page 164 and 165: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS D.C.: Depa
Page 166 and 167: AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS 97, 121; a
Page 168 and 169: Chapter 4 Operations between Vietna
Page 170 and 171: OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE
Page 202 and 203: Chapter 5 Ballistic Missile Defense
Page 204 and 205: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE Army cons
Page 206 and 207: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE Figure 80
Page 208 and 209: Figure 81. Spartan launch. The Spar
Page 210 and 211: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE a limited
Page 212 and 213: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE these wer
Page 214 and 215: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ment to c
Page 216 and 217: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE developin
Page 218 and 219: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE Radar Int
Page 220 and 221: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE when the
Page 222 and 223: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE casualtie
Page 224 and 225:
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE fluential
Page 226 and 227:
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE missiles
Page 228 and 229:
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE psycholog
Page 230 and 231:
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 6. Army O
Page 232 and 233:
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE April 196
Page 234 and 235:
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 54. Reiss
Page 236 and 237:
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 74. GWAPS
Page 238 and 239:
Chapter 6 Ground-Based Air Defense
Page 240 and 241:
GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SINCE 1990
Page 242 and 243:
Page 244 and 245:
Page 246 and 247:
Page 248 and 249:
Page 250 and 251:
Page 252 and 253:
Page 254 and 255:
Page 256 and 257:
Page 258 and 259:
Chapter 7 Ballistic Missile Defense
Page 260 and 261:
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE 19
Page 262 and 263:
Page 264 and 265:
Figure 96. Arrow launch.The Arrow i
Page 266 and 267:
Page 268 and 269:
Page 270 and 271:
Page 272 and 273:
Page 274 and 275:
Page 276 and 277:
Page 278 and 279:
Page 280 and 281:
Page 282 and 283:
Page 284 and 285:
Page 286 and 287:
Page 288 and 289:
Page 290 and 291:
Chapter 8 Summary, Trends, and Conc
Page 292 and 293:
SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS ev
Page 294 and 295:
SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS te
Page 296 and 297:
SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS EC
Page 298 and 299:
Index A-1, 128, 227-28, 232 A-4, 12
Page 300 and 301:
INDEX Convair, 98 Crotale, 158 D-da
Page 302 and 303:
INDEX Gulf of Tonkin incident, 115
Page 304 and 305:
INDEX Remagen, 24, 57, 270 RF-4C, 1
Page 306 and 307:
INDEX SAM, 34, 74, 81-82, 84, 87, 9
Page 308:
Archie to SAM A Short Operational H
show all

Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?