Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...
Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...
Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE<br />
psychological weapon, so <strong>to</strong>o were the Patriots. They provided<br />
great theater, with live videos <strong>of</strong> fiery launches, smoke trails,<br />
and aerial fireworks made more vivid with a dark, night background<br />
that had a positive impact on civilians and decision<br />
makers in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. (There is<br />
no indication that any Iraqis saw this very visible performance,<br />
and, if so, what impact it had on them.) The situation was<br />
manageable for the defenders as long as the Scud attacks were<br />
limited in number, accuracy, and lethality. Missile warning<br />
protected civilians from death and injury, while active missile<br />
defenses bolstered morale. The Patriots were an important fac<strong>to</strong>r<br />
in keeping Israel out <strong>of</strong> the war.<br />
Another fac<strong>to</strong>r in deterring Israel’s intervention was the intense<br />
direct <strong>of</strong>fensive campaign waged against the Scuds. The<br />
<strong>Air</strong>men flew almost 4,000 sorties, about 3.5 percent <strong>of</strong> the <strong>to</strong>tal<br />
scheduled by the coalition and three times the planned effort. 81<br />
The Army joined the <strong>Air</strong> Force in the anti-Scud campaign with<br />
both surface-<strong>to</strong>-surface rockets ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile<br />
System) and American and British Special Forces. According<br />
<strong>to</strong> secondary sources, they claimed between 10 and 20 Scud<br />
launchers destroyed. But <strong>to</strong> be clear, despite this massive<br />
coalition air and ground effort, similar <strong>to</strong> the World War II<br />
experience against the V-2, there is no confirmation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
destruction <strong>of</strong> a single mobile Scud launcher. 82<br />
In short, the Scuds were the greatest difficulty encountered<br />
by US forces in the Gulf War. Although not a military threat<br />
and inflicting few casualties, they certainly presented a valid<br />
challenge <strong>to</strong> the coalition’s unity and diverted considerable resources.<br />
While the <strong>Air</strong>men did not perform as they would have<br />
liked against the Scuds, they did enough <strong>to</strong> help keep the Israelis<br />
out <strong>of</strong> the war. The <strong>Air</strong>men also can take some credit for reducing<br />
the Iraqi launch rates from a one-third <strong>to</strong> one-half that seen<br />
in the Iran-Iraq War, even though the Iraqis had more missiles<br />
in 1991. Suppressing the launch rate meant the Iraqis could not<br />
fire in salvos that had the potential <strong>to</strong> swamp the Patriots. 83<br />
The Scuds were much less deadly than the German V-2s. In<br />
brief, although the Iraqis beat the coalition tactically with the<br />
Scuds, as coalition forces could not find and thus destroy the<br />
dated tactical ballistic missiles, the coalition was able <strong>to</strong> manage<br />
207