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Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE 1990S<br />

tions. In 1996, Clin<strong>to</strong>n countered congressional pressure for<br />

BMD with a ve<strong>to</strong>. 52<br />

Events, however, conspired against the treaty: the proliferation<br />

<strong>of</strong> missiles and NBC concerns with a number <strong>of</strong> countries;<br />

the Rumsfeld Report; North Korean missile developments; and<br />

domestic politics, especially Democratic fears that Republicans<br />

would use BMD as an issue in the 2000 elections. These<br />

events forced the administration <strong>to</strong> make key concessions, if<br />

not <strong>to</strong> capitulate, <strong>to</strong> BMD proponents. In January 1999, Secretary<br />

<strong>of</strong> Defense William Cohen announced a $6.6 billion,<br />

five-year program <strong>to</strong> develop a BMD system in addition <strong>to</strong> the<br />

almost $4 billion already budgeted. Cohen declared that the<br />

United States was seeking limited changes in the ABM treaty<br />

that would permit deployment <strong>of</strong> a restricted BMD and added<br />

that, failing such amendments, the United States might withdraw<br />

from the treaty. One journalist observed that Cohen’s<br />

announcement “angered the Russians, dismayed arms control<br />

advocates and spurred new efforts by congressional hawks <strong>to</strong><br />

abandon the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, which they believe<br />

inhibits US ability <strong>to</strong> protect itself against a growing missile<br />

threat.” 53<br />

Meanwhile, the administration attempted <strong>to</strong> reassure the<br />

Russians and arms-control supporters. Within hours <strong>of</strong> Cohen’s<br />

remarks, <strong>to</strong>p administration <strong>of</strong>ficials, including Secretary <strong>of</strong><br />

State Madeleine Albright and the president’s national security<br />

advisor, Samuel Berger, clarified or, according <strong>to</strong> some, repudiated<br />

Cohen’s words. 54 In an attempt <strong>to</strong> encourage the Russians<br />

<strong>to</strong> agree <strong>to</strong> treaty modifications, the administration went as far<br />

as <strong>to</strong> <strong>of</strong>fer US financial support <strong>to</strong> help the Russians finish an<br />

important radar installation in Siberia and upgrade another in<br />

Azerbaijan. Although there were a few weak mixed signals from<br />

Moscow, the Russians held <strong>to</strong> the view that the ABM treaty had<br />

<strong>to</strong> remain intact. 55<br />

Nevertheless, Clin<strong>to</strong>n bent <strong>to</strong> the political realities as the Congress<br />

passed, by a ve<strong>to</strong>-pro<strong>of</strong> margin, a National Missile Defense<br />

bill in March 1999. In July, Clin<strong>to</strong>n signed the measure that<br />

called for a national BMD as soon as technically feasible. The<br />

president also pledged <strong>to</strong> make the hard and fast decision in<br />

June 2000, although it appeared <strong>to</strong> be a mere formality in view<br />

253

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