Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE 1990S
share a nuclear risk. This, they postulated, would reinforce
the ever-present American isolationist sentiment and the
fortress America attitude and action. 46
The chief European complaint centers on the impact of BMD
development on the 1972 ABM treaty. These European critics
believe that a modification of this agreement and development
of the BMD would encourage the Russians to build up their offensive
and defensive forces, nullify the deterrent forces of
both Britain and France, and lead to an arms race with China
and Russia. 47 French President Jacques Chirac noted that “the
development of shields will always result in the proliferation of
swords.” 48 These advocates believed that the solution to the
problem of nuclear weapons was not technology but diplomacy
centered on the 1972 ABM treaty and the various agreements
that limit both defensive and offensive systems. They
insisted that the ABM treaty had to be maintained to achieve
arms reduction.
At the same time, technical and political changes were buffeting
the treaty. 49 In December 1993, the United States proposed
modifications to the agreement to clarify testing of BMDs
in what some perceived as being in the gray area. The treaty
permitted BMD geared against tactical ballistic missiles but
not against strategic missiles; however, these terms were not
defined. Nevertheless, for years the United States had informally
used the so-called Foster Box concept. It required approval
by a treaty compliance panel for American BMD tests
against targets exceeding 2 km per second and an intercept altitude
of 40 km. Therefore, the United States proposed setting
an upper limit on target speed and range against which the
systems could be tested, specifically 5 km per second in speed
and 3,500 km in range. 50 The Russians were willing to accept the
target speed limit but also wanted to restrict the interceptor
missile to a maximum speed of 3 km per second. In May 1995,
the two nations agreed to this arrangement. 51
At this point, these were the only concessions the Clinton
administration made toward deploying or developing the BMD.
In fact, earlier in a September 1993 five-year review of the
treaty, the administration moved away from some of the changes
proposed by the previous administration to relax treaty restric-
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