Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...
Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...
Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS<br />
firings from 30 per month in the first 11 months <strong>of</strong> air operations<br />
over the north <strong>to</strong> 270 per month between July 1966 and<br />
Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 1967. <strong>SAM</strong> firings peaked in the latter month when<br />
the North Vietnamese launched 590 <strong>to</strong> 740 <strong>SAM</strong>s, the most fired<br />
until the Linebacker II operations <strong>of</strong> 1972. From Oc<strong>to</strong>ber 1967<br />
<strong>to</strong> the bombing halt on 1 April 1968, <strong>SAM</strong> firings averaged 220<br />
each month. During this period, the American <strong>Air</strong>men observed<br />
5,366–6,037 <strong>SAM</strong>s, which downed 115–28 aircraft. 17<br />
Despite the increase in <strong>SAM</strong> firings, their effectiveness diminished.<br />
In 1965, it <strong>to</strong>ok almost 18 <strong>SAM</strong>s <strong>to</strong> down each American<br />
aircraft, a figure that rose <strong>to</strong> 35 in 1966, <strong>to</strong> 57 in 1967, and <strong>to</strong><br />
107 in 1968. A number <strong>of</strong> fac<strong>to</strong>rs contributed <strong>to</strong> this decline. 18<br />
The <strong>Air</strong>men quickly learned that the SA-2 could be outmaneuvered.<br />
The Soviets designed the SA-2 <strong>to</strong> destroy high-flying,<br />
nonmaneuvering, strategic bombers; but until 1972, it engaged<br />
primarily low-flying, maneuvering, tactical fighters. On clear<br />
days, alert <strong>Air</strong>men could spot SA-2 launches, as the missile<br />
was large, appeared <strong>to</strong> most flyers as a flying telephone pole,<br />
and left a visible smoke trail (fig. 58). The pilots would rapidly<br />
dive <strong>to</strong>ward the missile, and when it changed direction <strong>to</strong> follow<br />
the aircraft, the pilot would pull up as abruptly and as<br />
sharply as possible. The SA-2 could not follow such maneuvers.<br />
However, such action required sufficient warning, proper<br />
timing, and, <strong>of</strong> course, nerve and skill. To give pilots adequate<br />
time <strong>to</strong> maneuver, procedures prohibited the pilots from flying<br />
<strong>to</strong>o close <strong>to</strong> clouds between them and the ground. Later, the<br />
<strong>Air</strong>men received electronic devices that gave a visual and aural<br />
warning when <strong>SAM</strong> radar was tracking them. 19<br />
In addition, the American <strong>Air</strong>men directly <strong>to</strong>ok on the missiles.<br />
On 27 July, 46 US <strong>Air</strong> Force fighter-bombers attacked<br />
two missile sites and met disaster. The Central Intelligence<br />
Agency reported that they hit the wrong targets. Worse, North<br />
Vietnamese gunners downed three aircraft while a midair collision<br />
accounted for two others. Naval avia<strong>to</strong>rs had a similar<br />
experience, as they were unable <strong>to</strong> find one <strong>SAM</strong> site and lost<br />
six aircraft. Nevertheless, the anti-<strong>SAM</strong> attacks continued. In<br />
the first nine months <strong>of</strong> 1966, the <strong>Air</strong>men launched 75 strikes<br />
against 60 sites and claimed <strong>to</strong> have destroyed 25 and damaged<br />
25. Such attacks proved unpr<strong>of</strong>itable because <strong>of</strong> the <strong>to</strong>ugh de-<br />
121