Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

FROM GUNS TO MISSILES
to 1,285 in January 1953, to 2,981 in late March and early
April, then dropped to 1,281 in June, and, finally, rose to
about 1,515 in July. 18
The United States Air Force reluctantly and belatedly introduced
electronic countermeasures (ECM) in the Korean air
war because of fears that its use would reveal both US tactics
and equipment to the Communists. While this policy risked
Airmen’s lives, there was another issue. Although Korea was a
real war, it was secondary to the buildup stateside and in
Europe and preparations for a nuclear strike in the event of
World War III. Not only were the newest Air Force aircraft not
sent to Korea (for example, B-47s and B-36s), at first ECM was
not used, although this equipment and its associated tactics
had been employed in World War II. However, the Communist
introduction of the MiG-15 that savaged B-29s in daylight operations
pushed the USAF to begin ECM operations in April
1951 and night-bomber operations in October. Increasing losses
at night forced the Air Force to use chaff, a World War II technology,
in September 1952. ECM was effective. A postwar
USAF study concluded that during the night-bombing campaign,
ECM cut losses and damage by two-thirds. More specifically,
during the last six months of the war, in 78 percent of the
cases where the bombers were illuminated by radar-directed
searchlights, the bombers’ ECM broke the lock. 19
Another defensive tactic used by the USAF in night operations
was the direct attack. In two separate night attacks on
the crucial strategic targets in September and October 1952,
the Airmen used B-26s at low level to suppress Communist
searchlights illuminated by flares dropped by B-29s. Although
the bombers knocked out a number of the lights, the USAF
judged the tactic unsuccessful as only one-quarter of the lights
was destroyed, and the flares made the attacking bombers
more visible to the gunners. 20
Clearly, the Americans had forgotten much of their experience
with flak in World War II. The Airmen’s flak countermeasures
came as a response to losses and not from any study of the
situation or from previous experience. Not until late in the war,
after almost two years, did the Army and Air Force establish
effective coordination tactics. No one attempted to compare
80