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Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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Chapter 2<br />

From Guns <strong>to</strong> Missiles, 1945–1965<br />

Rapid demobilization <strong>of</strong> the American military followed the<br />

war’s end. As the magnificent US war machine disappeared, not<br />

much was left in its place. Americans thought little <strong>of</strong> either war<br />

or the military as they engaged in their peacetime pursuits,<br />

thereby leaving the US armed forces with minimal tangible<br />

strength. The two driving forces <strong>of</strong> national policy during this period<br />

were tight budgets and trust in the a<strong>to</strong>mic bomb. America<br />

based its defense on confidence in overall American superiority<br />

and distance, but most <strong>of</strong> all, on the bomb. Specifically, the<br />

United States had the a<strong>to</strong>mic bomb and a means <strong>to</strong> deliver it; the<br />

Soviet Union had neither.<br />

The <strong>of</strong>fensive problem seemed relatively simple <strong>to</strong> American<br />

<strong>Air</strong>men, compared <strong>to</strong> what they had just faced in World War II.<br />

Instead <strong>of</strong> vast formations <strong>of</strong> aircraft, now only one aircraft<br />

(with the equivalent bomb load <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> World War II<br />

bombers) needed <strong>to</strong> be employed. The penetration problem also<br />

appeared easier; for, in contrast <strong>to</strong> dense German defenses<br />

covering a target area <strong>of</strong> hundreds <strong>of</strong> miles, the Soviet Union<br />

had relatively sparse defenses <strong>to</strong> cover thousands <strong>of</strong> miles. Another<br />

fac<strong>to</strong>r favoring the <strong>of</strong>fensive was that jet aircraft <strong>of</strong>fered<br />

performance superior <strong>to</strong> that <strong>of</strong> World War II aircraft. Probably<br />

most important, instead <strong>of</strong> opposing a foe with essentially<br />

equivalent technology and the potential <strong>to</strong> develop superior<br />

technology, the United States now faced a nation considered<br />

<strong>to</strong> be years behind its own development. The most serious<br />

problems for the American <strong>Air</strong>men appeared <strong>to</strong> be those <strong>of</strong><br />

range and basing.<br />

American technological superiority delayed the <strong>Air</strong>men’s defensive<br />

concerns. Few <strong>Air</strong>men thought the Soviets would get<br />

nuclear weapons in short order, so certainly they would be slow<br />

<strong>to</strong> master the problem <strong>of</strong> weapons delivery over intercontinental<br />

distances. Consequently, American antiaircraft defenses shrank<br />

along with the entire American military <strong>to</strong> the extent that by<br />

late 1947, the US Army had only two battalions <strong>of</strong> AAA. Active<br />

69

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