Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
these were marginal and only capable against earlier missiles.
The SA-5 (Gammon) was first flight-tested in 1962 but did not
become operational until 1968. In the early 1980s, the Soviets
deployed more than 2,000 launchers at 120 sites. 27
The Soviets clearly were making a much greater effort in the
ABM field than was the United States. In a benign view, this
could be explained by the traditional defensive mind-set of the
Russians or attributed to their horrific experience in World
War II. A more ominous view was that the Soviets were trying
to obtain strategic nuclear superiority. In any case, it was believed
that the Soviets had invested $4 to $5 billion in ABM
programs by 1967 as compared to about $2 billion by the
United States. In 1967, Secretary McNamara estimated the
Soviets were spending 2.5 times as much as the United States
on air defense, while two years later, Secretary Melvin Laird
put that figure at 3.5 to 4 times. 28
In the early 1960s, ABM opponents focused on three major
aspects of the system. They raised the issue of the adverse impact
of a successful ABM system on the system of deterrence,
mutually assured destruction (MAD). Their fear was that ABM
defense would lead to an arms race (of both defensive and offensive
weapons) that would destabilize the international balance
of power. Cost was always a factor. While some used figures
as “low” as $4 to $5 billion, others saw much higher costs,
ranging between $4 billion for a thin ABM system to perhaps
$40 billion over 10 years for a more complete one. Some believed
that since fielding the ABM would only lead to the deployment
of more ICBMs that would nullify the defense, both
sides would only spend a lot of money for nothing. In the end,
however, the major objection to the deployment of an ABM
system was technical: would the system work against a mass
attack, work the first time it was needed, and work against sophisticated
threats that included decoys and jammers? 29
There was a wide range of opponents to the system, both inside
and outside the government. Perhaps the most prominent
within the administration was the secretary of defense. His objections
centered on the ABM cost and what it might encourage
(or force) the Soviets to do. He was consistent in his position
and tied the ABM to a nationwide shelter program that was ex-
191