Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE these were marginal and only capable against earlier missiles. The SA-5 (Gammon) was first flight-tested in 1962 but did not become operational until 1968. In the early 1980s, the Soviets deployed more than 2,000 launchers at 120 sites. 27 The Soviets clearly were making a much greater effort in the ABM field than was the United States. In a benign view, this could be explained by the traditional defensive mind-set of the Russians or attributed to their horrific experience in World War II. A more ominous view was that the Soviets were trying to obtain strategic nuclear superiority. In any case, it was believed that the Soviets had invested $4 to $5 billion in ABM programs by 1967 as compared to about $2 billion by the United States. In 1967, Secretary McNamara estimated the Soviets were spending 2.5 times as much as the United States on air defense, while two years later, Secretary Melvin Laird put that figure at 3.5 to 4 times. 28 In the early 1960s, ABM opponents focused on three major aspects of the system. They raised the issue of the adverse impact of a successful ABM system on the system of deterrence, mutually assured destruction (MAD). Their fear was that ABM defense would lead to an arms race (of both defensive and offensive weapons) that would destabilize the international balance of power. Cost was always a factor. While some used figures as “low” as $4 to $5 billion, others saw much higher costs, ranging between $4 billion for a thin ABM system to perhaps $40 billion over 10 years for a more complete one. Some believed that since fielding the ABM would only lead to the deployment of more ICBMs that would nullify the defense, both sides would only spend a lot of money for nothing. In the end, however, the major objection to the deployment of an ABM system was technical: would the system work against a mass attack, work the first time it was needed, and work against sophisticated threats that included decoys and jammers? 29 There was a wide range of opponents to the system, both inside and outside the government. Perhaps the most prominent within the administration was the secretary of defense. His objections centered on the ABM cost and what it might encourage (or force) the Soviets to do. He was consistent in his position and tied the ABM to a nationwide shelter program that was ex- 191
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE pensive and unpopular with both the public and politicians. 30 McNamara instead supported a deterrent strategy. 31 There were, of course, supporters of the system. Systems analysts opposed a growth in offensive systems and instead supported ABM defense for silo-based Minuteman ICBM missiles. And, while both the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the director of Defense Research and Engineering opposed deploying a Nike-X system, they both were “quite enthusiastic” about an ABM system oriented against a smaller ICBM threat. The military at the highest level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), put aside its interservice bickering to unite behind the Army’s ABM, one of a number of core programs. Within the administration, there were conflicting voices. The secretary of the Air Force (Harold Brown) and secretary of the Navy (Paul Nitze) favored some sort of deployment. There were also political pressures from Congress and not only from Republicans. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson feared that failure to deploy the system could generate a potential ABM gap that would be used by the Republicans in the upcoming election, just as the Democrats had effectively used the proported missile gap in the 1960 election. Johnson also feared that the military (specifically the JCS), unhappy about the conduct of the Vietnam War, would cause political woes. At this point, the public, as is so often the case, was uninformed and uninterested in the issue. In fact, a 1965 public opinion poll in Chicago revealed that 80 percent of the respondents thought the United States already had an ABM system in place! 32 As a side note, this misperception continues to this day. In late 1966, McNamara sold the president on a dual-track strategy to deal with the issue. The Johnson administration would attempt to fend off ABM proponents by continuing development and procuring long-lead items, while trying to placate opponents and negate a need for ABM by negotiating an arms control treaty with the Soviets. President Johnson favored arms control, as he preferred spending on his beloved Great Society domestic programs rather than on an unproductive, if not provocative, arms race. But the Soviets were not interested. In June 1967, President Johnson met with Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin at Glassboro, New Jersey, and discussed an arrange- 192
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Report Documentation Page Form Appr
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Air University Library Cataloging D
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Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER .
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CONTENTS Chapter Page 7 BALLISTIC M
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CONTENTS Figure Page 30 George Pred
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CONTENTS Figure Page 70 Blowpipe .
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Foreword Dr. Kenneth Werrell’s hi
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About the Author Dr. Kenneth P. Wer
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PREFACE excluded from the original
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PREFACE always been a factor in air
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Artillery Institute
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ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD
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Figure 7. British 40 mm light antia
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES American air
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES company deliv
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES (discussed la
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES flak rockets
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES 1953, the rat
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES to 1,285 in J
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 40. Ar
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES cember 1958,
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Figure 42. Nike Hercules. The Nike
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Airmen test-f
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Bomarc failed
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Despite knowl
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 47. Ha
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Army decided
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES The third fam
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES with both les
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES that fired ov
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 53. Br
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES The two-decad
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES A. H. Peterso
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES “SAMs Spur
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Chapter 3 Airmen versus Guerrillas:
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS the next y
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS war with t
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS Figure 56.
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS firings fr
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS and Navy c
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS American A
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS but modifi
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS In all, du
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS least an e
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Page 168 and 169: Chapter 4 Operations between Vietna
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Page 202 and 203: Chapter 5 Ballistic Missile Defense
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Page 238 and 239: Chapter 6 Ground-Based Air Defense
Page 240 and 241: GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SINCE 1990
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE 19
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Figure 96. Arrow launch.The Arrow i
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Chapter 8 Summary, Trends, and Conc
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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS ev
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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS te
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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS EC
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Index A-1, 128, 227-28, 232 A-4, 12
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INDEX Convair, 98 Crotale, 158 D-da
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INDEX Gulf of Tonkin incident, 115
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INDEX Remagen, 24, 57, 270 RF-4C, 1
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INDEX SAM, 34, 74, 81-82, 84, 87, 9
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Archie to SAM A Short Operational H
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