Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD WAR II
bombers to inhibit Japanese sound-controlled searchlights,
and use of high-gloss black paint. The rate of B-29 losses to
flak and flak plus fighters decreased steadily after peaking in
January 1945 at 1.06 percent of sorties. Tokyo was the most
bombed (4,300 of 26,000 sorties) and the best defended of the
Japanese targets. Its defenses accounted for 25 of the 55 flak
losses of the Twentieth Air Force and for 14 of its 28 losses to
flak plus fighters. As would be expected, American losses were
much lighter at the less-defended targets. Specifically, in flying
4,776 night sorties at low and medium altitudes against
major Japanese cities, the Twentieth Air Force lost 83 bombers
(1.8 percent) as compared with seven lost (.1 percent) under
similar conditions against secondary cities. 99
The Lessons of World War II
As in all major wars, World War II provided many lessons.
World War II is even more important to the Airman as it was
not only the first full-scale air war but also the only total air
war and the only American air war against a peer competitor.
Airmen of all countries tended to overlook or disregard flak.
Although the war indicated the value and lethality of flak, the
Airmen looked instead to lessons that better fit their preconceptions
and future intentions. The Airmen’s attitude changed
little from the interwar years when they considered flak to be
of little use and not worth the effort. The result of this disdain
would be evident in the wars that would follow.
In retrospect, at least six flak lessons emerged from World War
II. First, flak proved to be lethal and effective—downing more
US aircraft than any other enemy weapon. Clearly, it was the
big killer from early 1944 on. Concentrations of guns demonstrated
the ability to seriously inhibit or nullify aerial operations
such as the case of the V-1 campaign, the fall-winter 1944 oil
campaign, and operations against the Remagen Bridge.
Second, flak made low-level operations very costly. Flak
downed most of the American fighters lost during the war, the
bulk of these in strafing attacks. 100 A number of missions emphasized
the dangers of low-level operations; the most notable
were the Ploesti mission of August 1943, flak suppression at
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