Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF
four areas. In addition to having an electronic IFF capability,
the Stinger has a forward-firing capability, more resistance to
decoy flares, greater speed, and outranges the two-mile Redeye
by a mile. General Dynamics began development of the Stinger
in 1971, and it became operational in 1981. The missile’s
biggest success has been in Afghanistan. In fact, its influence
in that conflict prompted one reporter to write, “What the longbow
was to English yeomen . . . the Stinger antiaircraft missile
is to today’s American-backed guerrilla fighters.” 46
The war in Afghanistan clearly shows how missile technology
has given the guerrillas a valuable weapon. Initially, the Soviets,
while bogged down on the ground and largely confined to the
cities and fortified positions, made effective and growing use of
both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against sparse rebel
antiaircraft defenses (the United States sent 40 20 mm guns
in 1985), including SA-7 missiles. Soviet successes prompted
the United States to increase its support. In 1985, Blowpipes
were ordered, and reportedly, the rebels received 225 missiles.
Then, after an intra-governmental battle that pitted the US
State Department against the Central Intelligence Agency, in
which the former prevailed, the United States in late 1985 decided
to send Stingers to the insurgents.
The American Stingers were initially criticized for their weight
and complexity, but after a month in which 11 were fired without
a miss, they clearly demonstrated their effectiveness. One
secondary account asserts that the rebels scored their first
confirmed Stinger kills in late September 1986, downing three
Hind helicopters. Other accounts claim that the guerrillas
downed two helicopters and one fighter in October and 11 helicopters
and one MiG-23 in November (fig. 78). These losses
forced the Soviets to fly higher, to operate at farther distances
from their targets, and to restrict, if not abandon, their gunship
strikes, markedly reducing the military effectiveness of air power
and the Soviet military in general. In February 1987, Air Force
chief of staff Larry Welch testified that “somewhere between
150 and 300 Stingers have absolutely driven the Russian air
force out of the skies in Afghanistan.” 47 The rebels claimed to
have downed as many as 15 to 20 Soviet helicopters a month
and by the summer of 1987 may have downed one aircraft a
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