Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ment to curtail ABM deployment. McNamara told the Russians that limitations on defensive weapons were necessary to avoid an arms race. In response, the Soviet leader pounded the table and angrily replied: “Defense is moral, offense is immoral!” 33 Pressure on the administration mounted shortly thereafter when the Chinese announced they had detonated a hydrogen bomb. A few days after the Glassboro meeting, Johnson told McNamara that he would approve deployment. 34 In September 1967, McNamara delivered a key speech in San Francisco. Although he made clear that an ABM defense against a Soviet ICBM attack was both futile and expensive, the secretary of defense announced that the United States would deploy a “light” ABM system to protect the United States from a Chinese attack. 35 Another purpose of the US ABM system was to protect US (Minuteman) ICBMs and the United States against an accidental ICBM launch. The system would consist of the Spartan area defense and Sprint terminal defense of 25 major cities. The system would be known as Sentinel and cost an estimated $4–$5 billion. 36 ABM supporters had won a significant victory and thought the way was now clear. But if politics played an important role in bringing this about, the politics of the times played a role in derailing, or at least deflecting, ABM deployment. Citizen groups rose to oppose siting of the missiles in and around the major cities in which they lived. This was unexpected, as public opinion polls indicated that the public (the 40 percent of the public who expressed an opinion) supported ABM deployment by a margin of almost two to one. The problem was the classic one of “not in my backyard.” Stimulated by the activism and antiestablishment wave of the late 1960s and supported by the leadership and advice of numerous articulate, activist, and passionate scientists and academics, a protest movement upset the administration’s and proponent’s plans. Another, albeit less pervasive factor, was that intelligence agencies downgraded the threat of Chinese ICBMs to the United States. 37 Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts continued. In July 1968, President Johnson announced that talks with the Soviets would begin in September, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 193
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE derailed this effort. 38 This was the situation when a new administration came into office. Proponents of ABM expected the incoming Republicans to press forward with the ABM deployment. But Pres. Richard M. Nixon, the stereotypical cold warrior, was also a shrewd politician. Reacting to the popular discontent over the path Sentinel was taking, he changed the direction of the project within weeks. In March 1969, Nixon announced that the ABM system was being renamed (Safeguard), scaled down (from 17 Sprint sites to 12), relocated (from the cities), and reoriented (to defend the United States ICBMs). This was not only a compromise between the extremes of increase or cancellation; it also was a different path from the one trod by the previous Democratic administration. The fact of the matter was that Nixon saw the system as a bargaining chip in the ongoing arms negotiations. 39 The public and political battle continued. Early 1969 saw one of the hottest discussions of defense policy of post–World War II America. The public remained relatively uninformed or confused about the issue, but those who expressed an opinion continued to support ABM by a margin of nearly two to one. The Senate was a different matter. After a record 29-day debate, on 6 August 1969 the Senate voted and divided evenly, allowing Vice Pres. Spiro T. Agnew to cast the deciding vote to preserve the system. 40 Then, to the surprise of some and relief of many, America and the Soviet Union reached an agreement after difficult negotiations. In May 1972, the two superpowers signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreement that limited the number of strategic weapons. 41 As important as that treaty was, more important to this story was the agreement to limit ABMs. The ABM treaty was also concluded in May 1972. It permitted each country to have two ABM sites, one within 150 kilometers (km) of its national capital and another at least 1,300 km from the first and within 150 km of ICBM sites. Each site was limited to a maximum of 100 launchers and 100 interceptor missiles. The treaty prohibited developing, testing, and deploying systems (or their air-, mobile-, sea-, or space-based components) and upgrading existing systems to ABM capabilities. It further forbade 194
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Report Documentation Page Form Appr
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Air University Library Cataloging D
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Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER .
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CONTENTS Chapter Page 7 BALLISTIC M
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CONTENTS Figure Page 30 George Pred
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CONTENTS Figure Page 70 Blowpipe .
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Foreword Dr. Kenneth Werrell’s hi
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About the Author Dr. Kenneth P. Wer
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PREFACE excluded from the original
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PREFACE always been a factor in air
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Artillery Institute
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ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD
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Figure 7. British 40 mm light antia
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES American air
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES company deliv
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES (discussed la
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES flak rockets
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES 1953, the rat
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES to 1,285 in J
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 40. Ar
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES cember 1958,
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Figure 42. Nike Hercules. The Nike
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Airmen test-f
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Bomarc failed
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Despite knowl
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 47. Ha
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Army decided
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES The third fam
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES with both les
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES that fired ov
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Figure 53. Br
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES The two-decad
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES A. H. Peterso
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES “SAMs Spur
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Chapter 3 Airmen versus Guerrillas:
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS the next y
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS war with t
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS Figure 56.
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS firings fr
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS and Navy c
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS American A
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS but modifi
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS In all, du
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS least an e
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS War Vietna
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Page 168 and 169: Chapter 4 Operations between Vietna
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Page 202 and 203: Chapter 5 Ballistic Missile Defense
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Page 236 and 237: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 74. GWAPS
Page 238 and 239: Chapter 6 Ground-Based Air Defense
Page 240 and 241: GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SINCE 1990
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Figure 96. Arrow launch.The Arrow i
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE 19
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Chapter 8 Summary, Trends, and Conc
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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS ev
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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS te
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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS EC
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Index A-1, 128, 227-28, 232 A-4, 12
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INDEX Convair, 98 Crotale, 158 D-da
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INDEX Gulf of Tonkin incident, 115
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INDEX Remagen, 24, 57, 270 RF-4C, 1
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INDEX SAM, 34, 74, 81-82, 84, 87, 9
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Archie to SAM A Short Operational H
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