Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF
economy, speed, and maneuverability), and US restrictions on
ECM sales left the IAF in a serious bind. The result was that
“The IAF could go anywhere except near the Golan Heights
and the Suez fronts, where it was needed most. As they had
begun to do three years earlier, the Soviet missiles successfully
redefined the nature of modern war.” 11 In response, Israeli improvisation
was speedy and effective, yet costly.
The IAF used a variety of means to deal with the SAM threat.
To defeat heat-seeking missiles, it employed violent maneuvers,
turning toward the missile to present the IR seeker a “cold
side,” and maneuvering aircraft to cross in the sky creating a
“hot spot.” In addition, Israeli airmen dropped flares, even jettisoned
fuel, and then ignited it to decoy the heat-seeking missiles.
Spotters in helicopters warned pilots of missile launches. The
IAF also used chaff, first carried in speed brakes, later in a
more conventional manner; improved American ECM pods;
and standoff jammers operating from the ground, helicopters,
and transports.
In addition, the Israelis directly assaulted the SA-6s. The
SA-6’s low initial trajectory encouraged the IAF to dive-bomb
the SAMs from very steep angles—desperate measures improvised
for a desperate situation. The IAF also fired Shrike antiradiation
missiles. 12
The Israelis turned around the air war and to a degree the
ground action by taking out the Arab SAMs. Concentrating
first on the Syrians, the IAF destroyed half of their SAMs in
four days. Another factor that aided the IAF was that the Syrians
ran out of SA-6s. One source claims that the Israelis knocked
out a Syrian control center that seriously hampered the Syrian
missile defenses. The Syrians were defeated, and only political
restraints prevented a much greater Israeli victory. 13
The solution to the IAF’s problem on the Egyptian front came
from an unexpected source, the Israeli army. The Egyptians
made one major thrust from their formidable position along
the canal, venturing outside of their protective antiaircraft cover,
and suffering a decisive defeat on 14 October in the largest
tank battle since World War II. The Israelis quickly followed up
their tactical victory. In the early morning of 16 October, Israeli
forces crossed the canal and in short order created havoc in
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