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Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF<br />

The IAF clearly won the air war, destroying about 450 Arab<br />

aircraft, while losing about 107 aircraft in combat, 115 overall.<br />

Compared <strong>to</strong> the 1967 war, the Arabs lost about the same<br />

number <strong>of</strong> aircraft—although many more in the air—while the<br />

Israelis lost twice as many. On a sortie basis, however, IAF losses<br />

actually declined from 4 percent in 1967 <strong>to</strong> just over 1 percent<br />

in 1973. Arab losses in 1973 were just under 5 percent. 19<br />

Although the IAF defeated the Arab air forces in the air, it<br />

failed <strong>to</strong> use air power as it had in the 1967 war. CAS proved<br />

limited and disappointing, especially in the first three critical<br />

days <strong>of</strong> the war. One study concluded that aircraft did not unequivocally<br />

damage or destroy one tank. Even if this decline in<br />

CAS effectiveness is overdrawn, air power clearly influenced<br />

the war less in 1973 than it had in 1967. A dense, mobile, mixed,<br />

surface-based air defense system thwarted arguably the besttrained<br />

and highest motivated air force in the world and inflicted<br />

severe losses on it. Just as American <strong>Air</strong>men underestimated<br />

North Vietnamese air defenses, so had the Israeli<br />

airmen underestimated Arab air defenses. Both paid the price.<br />

The 1973 war seemed <strong>to</strong> indicate that the balance between the<br />

<strong>of</strong>fense and defense (specifically aircraft versus ground defenses)<br />

had swung in favor <strong>of</strong> the latter. <strong>Air</strong>craft appeared <strong>to</strong> have lost<br />

its battlefield dominance. 20 The IAF action in Lebanon in the<br />

summer <strong>of</strong> 1982 altered this view.<br />

Combat since 1973: Bekaa Valley<br />

Lebanon existed in a state <strong>of</strong> chaos from the occupation by<br />

militias <strong>of</strong> right and left, Palestinian guerrillas, the Syrian army,<br />

and from fighting among these groups and between them and<br />

the Israelis. The Syrians rebuilt their military forces from the<br />

defeat <strong>of</strong> the 1973 war and, in so doing, almost tripled their<br />

ground-based air defenses, increasing them from 30 <strong>to</strong> 80 batteries<br />

and manning them with their best personnel. In late<br />

April 1981, the Syrians moved 19 missile batteries, including<br />

SA-6s, in<strong>to</strong> Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. Here, the Syrians established<br />

a dense and, what appeared from the record <strong>of</strong> the 1973<br />

war, <strong>to</strong> be a formidable air defense system. 21<br />

155

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