Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Shortly after American involvement in the Vietnam War ended,
air operations in the Middle East seemed to indicate the predominance
of the defense. Unlike the 1967 Arab-Israeli War in
which the Israeli Air Force was overwhelmingly triumphant, the
1973 war indicated the renewed power of the defense. The
Arabs violated two concepts of conventional war: attacking a
country with superior military forces and attacking without air
superiority. They advanced under a dense umbrella of SAMs and
guns that downed many Israeli aircraft. Although the Israelis
won the war, they suffered heavy aircraft losses, and their air
force was unable to influence operations as it had in 1967.
Ground-based air defenses appeared to have regained the edge.
Operations in 1982 between the Arabs and Israelis cast doubt
on these findings. In a short and sharp action, the Israeli air
force won an air battle against Syrian MiGs and SAMs, a battle
that was even more lopsided than their 1967 victory.
A few months earlier, on the other side of the world, the lessons
of another conflict were less clear. In the Falklands, a small
force from a Western power with superior technology defeated a
larger force from a less-developed country. However, the Argentine
air force battered the Royal Navy despite the restrictions of
range, old aircraft, old bombs, and lack of ECM. Although the
British air defense imposed heavy losses on the attackers, the
Argentines did get through to severely punish the defenders.
The war in Afghanistan seemed to indicate the superiority of
the defense. This action pitted a modern air force against a
lightly armed guerrilla force in rugged terrain, similar to the
Vietnam War. The Soviet air force did reasonably well until the
guerrillas employed advanced, man-portable SAMs. These inflicted
substantial losses on the airmen, forced them to modify
their tactics to reduce their vulnerability, and by so doing reduced
their effectiveness. As a result, the military advantage
shifted to the insurgents, who eventually drove the Soviets from
the country and the war.
In contrast, the offense scored a quick and decisive victory
over the defense in the 1990–91 war in the Persian Gulf. It
matched a large, well-equipped military—certainly by third world
standards—against an even larger, better equipped and trained
international coalition. The coalition used mass and superior
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