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Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF<br />

In early June 1982, the Israelis invaded Lebanon, primarily<br />

fighting the Palestinian guerrillas but also engaging the Syrians.<br />

The Israelis battered the latter, despite their large arsenal <strong>of</strong><br />

modern Soviet equipment and the “lessons” <strong>of</strong> the 1973 war. In<br />

this brief but intense action, the Israelis won a lopsided vic<strong>to</strong>ry,<br />

destroying 80 <strong>to</strong> 90 Syrian aircraft and 19 <strong>to</strong> 36 batteries <strong>of</strong><br />

missiles, for the destruction <strong>of</strong> three <strong>to</strong> six Israeli aircraft. In<br />

addition, Israeli ground fire downed at least one Syrian jet (a<br />

Vulcan gun got an Su-7) and two helicopters. 22<br />

On 9 June, the IAF <strong>to</strong>ok on the Syrian air defenses in the<br />

Bekaa Valley with a complex, carefully planned, well-coordinated,<br />

and effectively executed attack. The Israelis used air- and<br />

ground-launched drones as decoys <strong>to</strong> activate Syrian radar.<br />

This allowed the Israeli EC-135s <strong>to</strong> obtain the location and frequency<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Syrian radars, information they rapidly relayed<br />

<strong>to</strong> strike elements. The Israelis thereby coupled real-time intelligence<br />

with rapid response <strong>to</strong> give their pilots precise locations<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>SAM</strong>s and accurate tuning information for their<br />

jamming equipment. In the electronics war, the IAF used ECM<br />

pods, chaff rockets, possibly chaff from drones, and stand<strong>of</strong>f<br />

jammers in CH-53, Boeing 707, and Arava transports. The Israeli<br />

airmen employed diversionary tactics, precise timing,<br />

sharply executed low-level tactics, and weapons such as<br />

ARMs, stand<strong>of</strong>f munitions, iron bombs, and cluster bombs. In<br />

addition, the Israelis used a new surface-<strong>to</strong>-surface ARM, the<br />

Wolf missile. <strong>Ground</strong> forces fired artillery, launched ground<br />

assaults along the front, and just before the air attack, <strong>to</strong>ok<br />

out a control center with a commando raid. The Syrians did<br />

not help their own cause, as they failed <strong>to</strong> dig in, sited their<br />

radar poorly, and ignited smoke screens that guided, rather<br />

than confused, the IAF. On the first day, the IAF destroyed 17<br />

missile batteries and severely damaged two others. The Syrians<br />

pushed more <strong>SAM</strong> units in<strong>to</strong> the Bekaa Valley, but <strong>to</strong> no avail.<br />

On the second day <strong>of</strong> the action, the IAF destroyed 11 more<br />

missile batteries. On 24 July, the Israelis knocked out three<br />

batteries <strong>of</strong> SA-8s. A few days later, they destroyed some<br />

SA-9s. Reportedly, the IAF destroyed four SA-9 batteries in<br />

September (fig. 69). 23<br />

156

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