Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF
range directed the guns, which could reach an effective range
of about 4,000 feet. There were also optical sights. Similar to
the SA-6, the weapon’s chief assets were its low-altitude capability,
mobility, and the absence of previous observation in action
by the West. 8
Following the initial Arab assault, as expected, the Israelis
quickly launched tank and aircraft counterattacks to blunt
the advance of the invading Arab armies, to succor the outnumbered
and outgunned forward defenders, and to shield its
own mobilization. However, Israel’s tankers, airmen, equipment,
and tactics failed against Arab missiles and guns. On the Suez
front, the IAF lost four aircraft in their first strike; and, on the
Golan Heights front, they lost four out of four aircraft on the
first wave and two of four aircraft on the second wave. Some
claim that Arab gunners downed as many as 30 to 40 Israeli
aircraft on the first day of the war.
During the first three days, the IAF lost dozens of aircraft,
perhaps as many as 50, at the Suez front. These heavy losses
(twice the rate of the 1967 war) shocked the Israelis, who, for
the moment, stopped flying within 10–15 miles of the Suez
Canal. However, the grave military situation required the IAF
to continue its efforts, especially on the critical Syrian front.
During the first week, the IAF lost a total of 78–90 aircraft, a
sizable percentage of its force. 9
The SA-7 had little direct impact on the battle and probably
served most as a nuisance to the Israelis and a morale booster
to the Arabs. The shoulder-fired SAM downed only two fixedwing
aircraft and damaged 30 others. Aircraft could outrun
and outmaneuver the missile, as US Airmen had proved the
year before. In addition, the SA-7 lacked killing power; it hit
aircraft in their tail, where its small warhead usually did not
inflict catastrophic damage. A vehicle-mounted arrangement,
the SA-8, fitted with eight SA-7s, was no more effective. 10
On the other hand, the SA-6 proved especially effective by
destroying a sizable proportion of IAF aircraft and indirectly by
forcing Israeli aircraft into Arab AAA fire. The SAM’s rapid
speed and its new and changing frequencies were difficult to
counter. The overconfidence of the Israelis, their neglect of ECM
(at one point, the IAF stripped ECM from their aircraft for greater
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