Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SINCE 1990
the coalition forces fired 200 HARMs and during the first week
used most of the 2,000 expended in the war. 29
Another antiradiation missile was the ALARM (air-launched
antiradar missile). The British completed its trials in October
1990 and rushed it to the theater. The two-stage missile climbed
to about 40,000 feet, where after rocket burnout, a parachute
deployed and allowed the missile to slowly float earthward.
During this 10-minute period, the missile searched for radars
entered into its electronic library and, if detected, discarded
the parachute and sought them out. In all, the Royal Air Force
flew two dozen missions and fired 113 ALARMs. 30
The Airmen were especially effective against Iraqi electronic
equipment. Iraqi radar activity on day seven of the war was
only 10 percent of that on day one. Reportedly, 85 percent of
the radar-guided SAMs launched by the Iraqis were unguided,
and these missiles accounted for only 10 percent of the coalition
aircraft losses. 31
In addition to the intimidation and destruction caused by
the antiradiation missiles, the coalition airmen made tactical
changes that degraded the Iraqi ground-based air defenses.
Specifically, after suffering losses in the first three days of
combat employing low-level tactics with which they had trained
before the war, the airmen shifted their operations to medium
altitudes of around 15,000 feet. 32 Higher-altitude operations
decreased the effectiveness of both AAA and infrared-guided
SAMs. However, operations from higher altitudes also decreased
bombing accuracy with “dumb” bombs, increased the interference
of weather to precision-guided munitions delivery, and
reduced the effectiveness of the A-10’s potent 30 mm cannon.
For example, the F-16s achieved peacetime accuracy of 30 feet
with unguided bombs, but during the war, this rose to 200
feet. 33 One postwar study notes that this change in altitude
“was one of the most significant changes in allied strike planning,
since peacetime training for most of the contributors for
air power (including the most important, the United States and
the United Kingdom) had emphasized low-level delivery of
weapons.” 34 The Gulf War demonstrated that the better way to
combat dense air defenses was to use SEAD operations (US
Air Force tactics) rather than the low-level tactics of NATO. 35
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