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Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS<br />

In contrast, defense technology made great strides during<br />

the war. Flak grew from an ineffective nuisance weapon in<strong>to</strong> a<br />

potent force by 1944. Although AAA could not s<strong>to</strong>p determined<br />

<strong>Air</strong>men, it could inflict heavy losses on the flyers, disrupt accuracy,<br />

and, in general, make air operations much more expensive.<br />

The notable antiaircraft successes, such as Allied guns<br />

in the V-1 campaign, German flak defense <strong>of</strong> the oil targets,<br />

and American defense <strong>of</strong> the Remagen Bridge, all strongly<br />

support this point. Relative <strong>to</strong> defensive aircraft, flak proved<br />

inexpensive and very cost effective.<br />

The two major technical advances responsible for the improvement<br />

and success <strong>of</strong> ground-based air defenses during<br />

World War II were radar and proximity fuzes. Radar stripped<br />

the cloak <strong>of</strong> surprise and invisibility from aircraft. It provided<br />

detection and warning <strong>of</strong> attacking aircraft, allowed control <strong>of</strong><br />

defensive fighters, and permitted more accurate all-weather,<br />

day/night firing <strong>of</strong> AAA. Other devices increased the lethality<br />

<strong>of</strong> flak, none more so than proximity fuzes. Fortunately for the<br />

Allies, only they fielded this device.<br />

As a result, <strong>Air</strong>men learned that AAA constituted a dangerous<br />

and powerful force. The World War II experience also proved<br />

that low-level operations in the face <strong>of</strong> flak were costly because<br />

guns were increasingly effective at lower altitudes. The increasing<br />

lethality <strong>of</strong> the guns exposed an enduring problem, the<br />

gunner’s difficulty in correctly identifying friend or foe—not<br />

engaging the former and always engaging the latter. Experience<br />

showed numerous instances, however, <strong>of</strong> friends downed<br />

by friendly fire and gunners letting foes slip by.<br />

To counter ground fire, <strong>Air</strong>men adopted tactics that would be<br />

used repeatedly in subsequent air wars. Besides avoiding flak<br />

areas, the flyers <strong>to</strong>ok advantage <strong>of</strong> surprise, the sun, the terrain,<br />

and one-pass attacks. They also employed electronic countermeasures,<br />

specifically, chaff and jammers. Finally, however<br />

<strong>Air</strong>men attacked their <strong>to</strong>rmen<strong>to</strong>rs, although direct action seldom<br />

proved effective, it usually was expensive. The trade-<strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong><br />

cheap guns for valuable aircraft made direct attack a high-risk<br />

proposition with low return.<br />

Therefore, during the course <strong>of</strong> World War II, the balance between<br />

air <strong>of</strong>fense and air defense tilted <strong>to</strong>ward the defense. Yet,<br />

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