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Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES<br />

Despite knowledge <strong>of</strong> the SA-2 since 1957 and its potential<br />

(similar <strong>to</strong> the Nike Ajax), the United States made only mixed<br />

progress with countermeasures. Tight budgets in the late<br />

1950s hampered these efforts. <strong>Air</strong>men assigned high priority<br />

<strong>to</strong> countermeasures against the SA-2 in budgets for fiscal<br />

years 1964 and 1965, but this was <strong>to</strong>o late. The American <strong>Air</strong>men<br />

had nothing effective <strong>to</strong> use when the need arose. Because<br />

<strong>of</strong> a joint <strong>Air</strong> Force–Army exercise in 1964, using the Hawk<br />

missile, some <strong>Air</strong>men concluded that aircraft could not operate<br />

in <strong>SAM</strong>-protected areas. (It should be noted that Hawk was a<br />

more capable <strong>SAM</strong> than was the SA-2.)<br />

Although it is easy and partially correct <strong>to</strong> blame tight funding,<br />

it is also true that the <strong>Air</strong>men underestimated the requirement<br />

for countermeasures. Although the USAF equipped strategic<br />

bombers with electronic warning and jamming devices in<br />

the late 1950s, it did not similarly equip tactical fighters and<br />

bombers. Initially, the US Navy did a better job. Whatever the<br />

reason—money, obsession with nuclear weapons delivery,<br />

electrical power requirements, trust in fighter maneuverability<br />

or speed—the USAF’s tactical air forces were unprepared for<br />

the style <strong>of</strong> combat they would face in Vietnam. 41<br />

The United States developed two other families <strong>of</strong> missiles<br />

that were considerably smaller and much more mobile. The<br />

1946 Stilwell Board saw the need for lightweight, man-carried<br />

equipment for US soldiers and concluded that the existing .50-<br />

caliber machine gun was inadequate. It sought an antiaircraft<br />

machine gun capable <strong>of</strong> engaging aircraft flying up <strong>to</strong> 1,000 mph<br />

at ranges <strong>of</strong> 200 <strong>to</strong> 2,500 yards. Four years later, the Army requested<br />

a family <strong>of</strong> weapons <strong>to</strong> counter aircraft flying up <strong>to</strong> 1,000<br />

mph at altitudes from zero <strong>to</strong> 60,000 feet and at horizontal<br />

ranges up <strong>to</strong> 27,000 yards. From these studies came the formal<br />

requirement in early 1951 for a surface-<strong>to</strong>-air guided missile <strong>to</strong><br />

protect forward combat units from low-altitude aerial attack. 42<br />

The United States began development <strong>of</strong> Hawk in 1952 (fig.<br />

46). Progress was relatively rapid. The Army awarded<br />

Raytheon a development contract in July 1954, began flighttesting<br />

in June 1956, started production in 1957, and activated<br />

the first missile unit in August 1960. 43 To better defend<br />

against low-flying aircraft, in 1964, the Army began an upgraded<br />

92

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