Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS
war with tactics and aircraft designed for nuclear warfare. The
best example of this mismatch was the F-105. A fighter with
an internal bomb bay—a contradiction in terms—it was the US
Air Force’s workhorse, flying many of the missions over the
north and suffering the most damage. 9
The United States, for its entire technological prowess, was
ill equipped in other areas as well. At the beginning of the air
war, the United States was still using unguided (dumb) munitions,
just as Airmen had used in World War I! Thus, aircrews
had to overfly their targets, which proved dangerous and often
fatal. 10 Second, the United States had inadequate electronic
ECM. Although Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52s were reasonably
equipped, TAC fighters were not. The irony therefore is
that, until late in the war, the better-equipped B-52s operated
unopposed over South Vietnam, while throughout the war,
fighters flew against the growing and increasingly lethal defenses
in North Vietnam.
Another factor, perhaps the most important, was that the
Americans underestimated the power of the defense and the
abilities of the North Vietnamese. The Airmen focused on the
weapons on which Airmen always focus, where the glamour
and glory are, fighters and air-to-air combat. It is true that the
North Vietnamese built up their air force. But, this air force
proved as elusive as the Vietcong, using guerrilla tactics of hitand-run
and fighting only when circumstances were favorable.
With the major exception of Operation Bolo in January 1967,
when US fighter pilots ambushed the North Vietnamese fighters
and destroyed seven MiGs without a loss, American Airmen
did not engage in major air battles and thus were unable to
rack up scores as they had in World War II and Korea. 11 While
glamorous as always, a matter of pride, and a symbol of success,
air-to-air combat was neither frequent nor important in the
Vietnam air war. The principal Communist weapon against US
aircraft was AAA. American Airmen not only underestimated
North Vietnamese defenses, they especially underestimated
the impact of flak. Both were serious mistakes.
The North Vietnamese fielded a formidable ground-based air
defense system. In early 1965, the North Vietnamese manned
about 1,200 antiaircraft guns, which they increased to almost
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