Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS ECCM. The big area of opportunity is in the field of multiple sensors. Both friendly air defenders and their airmen partners would benefit greatly from the introduction of effective identification equipment. Until the problem of rapidly and accurately sorting out friends from foes is solved, the effectiveness of both the offense and defense will be greatly reduced. In short, the area that needs to be exploited is electronics. Advances in civilian technology indicate that much can be expected from electronics—less expensive, smaller, and more capable equipment. Therefore, the future seems to belong to those who can best use—not just field—modern, high-cost high technology in combat. This will decide the outcome of wars and the balance between the offense and defense. Conclusions Historically, US Air Force assumptions about future conflicts have proven to be in error. Since 1945, the Air Force has geared itself for air-to-air combat and a nuclear exchange with a major power. Although this certainly was America’s most serious challenge during the past 60 years, the reality of war since 1945 has proven to be far different. Since World War II, the US Air Force has fought in three wars against minor powers, used conventional weapons, and found its chief opposition to be ground-based air defense weapons. These conflicts proved different from their anticipation, but again they indicated the power of the defense. The first two, Korea and Vietnam, demonstrated the problems of fighting an extended campaign against a primitive, determined, and resourceful enemy. Vietnam also saw the introduction of the SAM, which tilted the balance away from the offense toward the defense. Americans countered these threats using ECM, direct action, and tactics; however, they never found an acceptable solution at a reasonable price. The US military was forced to relearn old lessons at considerable cost. It is important to note that since 1945 the United States has not faced a peer competitor in direct air-to-air combat as it did over Europe in World War II. With the exception of Korea, where the United States faced a larger force of equivalent quality air- 275
SUMMARY, TRENDS, AND CONCLUSIONS to-air fighters, the US Air Force has had the advantages of numbers, technology, training, command and control, and spirit. That American effort paid off in the air-to-air battle, but victory tended to obscure another threat to air operations. For at the same time, the Airmen paid far less attention to the peril of ground-based defenses in peacetime and, as a result, paid a high price in wartime. The Gulf War was primarily a tale of offensive superiority, although it again demonstrated the continuing importance and cost to Airmen of ground-based defenses. The overwhelming triumph in the Gulf War was due to many factors; however, two of the most important technologies clearly were stealth and the improvement of standoff PGMs. In the long and continuing contest between offense and defense, the Gulf War indicated that currently the offense is ascendant. This impact is magnified by the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower with overwhelming dominance in the areas of economics, technology, and military. Nevertheless, actions over the Balkans and Iraq reinforce the view that although the offensive is dominant, ground-based air defenses are still a force to be reckoned with and can still impose costs on the Airmen. The situation is far from static. American Airmen should realize that increased capabilities of ground-based air defenses challenge them in two important ways. The first and most obvious is to make their job more difficult and dangerous, whether it be in a major conflict with a major foe or in a minor conflict with a minor foe. The other aspect is the impact of this air offense/defense balance on friendly powers, who will undoubtedly request US assistance for their air force problems. This study indicates the potential pitfalls of air defense systems and possible solutions to counter these systems based on past and recent experience. Clearly, ground-based air defense weapons are a vital issue to American Airmen of today and tomorrow. If our Airmen are to be successful, they must pay more attention to ground-based air defenses than they have in the past and meet and master the challenge of these systems. The world is not static; the duel between offense and defense will continue. 276
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Report Documentation Page Form Appr
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Air University Library Cataloging D
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Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER .
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CONTENTS Chapter Page 7 BALLISTIC M
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CONTENTS Figure Page 30 George Pred
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CONTENTS Figure Page 70 Blowpipe .
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Foreword Dr. Kenneth Werrell’s hi
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About the Author Dr. Kenneth P. Wer
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PREFACE excluded from the original
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PREFACE always been a factor in air
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Artillery Institute
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ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD
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Figure 7. British 40 mm light antia
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES American air
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES flak rockets
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES cember 1958,
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Figure 42. Nike Hercules. The Nike
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES Airmen test-f
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES A. H. Peterso
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FROM GUNS TO MISSILES “SAMs Spur
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Chapter 3 Airmen versus Guerrillas:
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS the next y
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS war with t
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS Figure 56.
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS firings fr
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS but modifi
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS War Vietna
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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS D.C.: Depa
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Chapter 4 Operations between Vietna
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OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE
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Chapter 5 Ballistic Missile Defense
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE Army cons
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Figure 81. Spartan launch. The Spar
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE a limited
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BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 74. GWAPS
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Chapter 6 Ground-Based Air Defense
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GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SINCE 1990
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