Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SINCE 1990
percent losses and instead expected losses of about 150 aircraft
in a 30-day campaign. Warden thought that probably no more
than 40 would be lost over a six-day campaign. At his dramatic
and crucial briefing of General Horner, Warden used the figures
of 3 percent losses on the first day and then a 0.5 percent
attrition rate. He believed that about 150 aircraft would
be lost. Retired Air Force general Charles Donnelly told a
House committee that 100 aircraft would be lost in a 10-day
campaign of 20,000 sorties. Horner writes in his postwar
memoirs that he expected to lose 42 US Air Force aircraft,
while Glosson thought no more than 80 aircraft would be lost.
A computer study that did not employ stealth aircraft (it is unclear
why, but it apparently also did not include cruise missiles)
indicated losses of one-half of the Air Force F-111Fs and Navy
A-6s. This led to the decision to only use the F-117 and cruise
missile against targets in Baghdad. A postwar account notes
that in contrast to the predictions of an attrition rate of 0.5
percent of sorties, combat losses amounted to 0.05 percent. 18
The coalition employed three principal means to neuter Iraqi
ground-based air defenses: deception, jamming, and destruction.
The Airmen used drones to spoof Iraqi radar, not only to
confuse the operators but also to encourage them to disclose
their position and thus make them vulnerable to direct countermeasures.
The Navy was out in front with this concept, learning
from the successful Israeli use of spoofing drones in the
1982 Bekaa Valley operation. The Navy bought versions of the
Israeli Sampson drone, which they named TALD (Tactical Air
Launched Decoy) (fig. 92). Marine and Navy aircraft could
carry up to eight of the small (less than eight feet long and
fewer than 400 pounds), cheap ($18,000) drones on a standard
bomb rack. It was equipped with various means to simulate
American aircraft and in addition, could drop chaff. The major
disadvantage of the unpowered device was its limited range,
which was dependent on launch altitude. 19
The Air Force, at the initiative of one of Warden’s subordinates,
Maj Mark “Buck” Rogers, proposed using some Navy
BQM-74 target drones for the same purpose (fig. 93). Although
the deputy chief of staff for planning, Gen Jimmie Adams, rejected
the plan, a request from CENTCOM led to its adoption.
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