Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

OPERATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF
even with small numbers of aircraft and SAMs, imposed heavy
losses on these aircraft and aircrews. But the Argentines did
penetrate the defenses, did inflict much damage on the more
costly British fleet, and came close to repulsing the British
counterinvasion. Nevertheless, the British won the war.
Immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets
made good use of air power in support of ground operations
against the guerrillas. Initially, limited rebel antiaircraft protection
could not disrupt this air support; but, the introduction
of more modern and lethal man-portable SAMs did. These
missiles not only inflicted substantial losses on Soviet aircraft,
they forced the Airmen to use less-effective tactics and eroded
the morale of the Afghan pilots. In brief, these weapons neutralized
air power, which, in turn, turned the tide on the ground.
In short order, the Soviets withdrew in defeat.
If these wars demonstrated anything, they showed the potential
of high technology. At the same time, they indicated that
numbers and weapons handling are extremely important to the
final outcome. High-technology weapons demand high-quality
personnel.
Notes
1. Victor Flintham, Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat,
1945 to the Present (New York: Facts on File Yearbook, Inc., 1990), 46;
Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York: Schocken Books, Inc.,
1965), 177–78, 221; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in
the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982), 145; Trevor Dupuy, Elusive
Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947–1974 (New York: Harper and Row,
1978), 212; and Stephen Peltz, “Israeli Air Power,” Flying Review International,
December 1967, 1019.
2. Edward N. Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz, The Israeli Army (New York:
Harper and Row, 1975), 229–30; Nadav Safran, From War to War—The Arab-
Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967 (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.,
1969), 324–25; Murray Rubenstein and Richard Goldman, Shield of David
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1978), 100; Robert Jackson, The
Israeli Air Force Story (London: Stacey, 1970), 218; Warren Wetmore, “Israeli
Air Punch Major Factor in War,” Aviation Week, 3 July 1967, 22; and Edgar
O’ Ballance, The Third Arab-Israeli War (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1972),
67, 75, 82.
3. Jackson, The Israeli Air Force, 153, 248; Wetmore, “Israeli Air Punch,”
2; James Hansen, “The Development of Soviet Tactical Air Defense,” Inter-
174