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Archie to SAM: A Short Operational History of Ground-Based Air ...

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AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS<br />

Linebacker II<br />

On 14 December President Nixon gave the North Vietnamese<br />

72 hours <strong>to</strong> get back <strong>to</strong> serious negotiations “or else.” The “or<br />

else” was a three-day bombing <strong>of</strong>fensive against North Vietnam,<br />

which Nixon ordered that day and then changed on 19 December<br />

<strong>to</strong> an indefinite period. The object <strong>of</strong> Linebacker II—the code<br />

name for the December bombing—was <strong>to</strong> restart negotiations. 40<br />

US <strong>Air</strong>men returned <strong>to</strong> the home <strong>of</strong> the <strong>SAM</strong>s, AAA, and MiGs<br />

on the night <strong>of</strong> 18 December. 41 For three consecutive days, the<br />

script was about the same. First, F-111s began with attacks on<br />

airfields and various other targets at 1900, kicking <strong>of</strong>f an operation<br />

that lasted about nine and one-half hours. 42 About 20 <strong>to</strong><br />

65 minutes later, the first <strong>of</strong> three waves <strong>of</strong> B-52s unloaded their<br />

bombs. The second wave followed about four hours later and<br />

was in turn followed by the third wave about five hours later.<br />

Each wave consisted <strong>of</strong> 21 <strong>to</strong> 51 B-52s supported by 31 <strong>to</strong> 41<br />

other aircraft, and each wave flew exactly the same pattern:<br />

the same heading from the west and, after a sharp turn after<br />

bombing, the same exit heading <strong>to</strong> the west. There were also<br />

daylight attacks by <strong>Air</strong> Force, Marine, and Navy aircraft.<br />

The bombing rocked Hanoi, but the aircraft losses jolted the<br />

<strong>Air</strong>men as well. During the first three days <strong>of</strong> the operations,<br />

12 aircraft went down, not a large number and seemingly<br />

bearable; however, B-52 losses—three on the first night and six<br />

on the third—were shocking. B-52s were, after all, America’s<br />

primary strategic nuclear bomber, the foundation <strong>of</strong> the airbreathing<br />

leg <strong>of</strong> the Triad. Up <strong>to</strong> this point, the US <strong>Air</strong> Force<br />

had lost only one B-52 <strong>to</strong> enemy fire, although 17 had been<br />

lost <strong>to</strong> other causes. While the overall B-52 loss rate <strong>of</strong> 3 percent<br />

<strong>of</strong> effective sorties on the three missions appeared acceptable,<br />

the loss rate on the third mission was 6.8 percent, and<br />

the nine B-52s lost <strong>to</strong> this point in Linebacker II represented<br />

almost 5 percent <strong>of</strong> the 170 <strong>to</strong> 210 B-52s the US <strong>Air</strong> Force had<br />

deployed in Southeast Asia and over 2 percent <strong>of</strong> the 402 in<br />

service in 1972. 43 This was reminiscent <strong>of</strong> the summer and fall<br />

<strong>of</strong> 1943 over Germany.<br />

The B-52 losses highlighted a number <strong>of</strong> problems. First, the<br />

B-52 fleet was <strong>of</strong> mixed quality, consisting <strong>of</strong> 107 <strong>of</strong> the older<br />

132

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