Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• Opposition to Israel was ritualistic. Quartet memberssaw Israel as a secondary threat compared toIran. Israel had no land border with Iraq and wasunlikely to mount a sustained attack on Iraq.Shaping Regime Intent—Saddam, WMD and theLieutenantsAll Quartet members were convinced that WMD hadsaved Iraq in the war against Iran. ‘Ali Hasan and‘Izzat Ibrahim were personally involved in the useof chemical weapons (CW) in securing the Regimeduring the Shi’a Intifada by virtue of having held areacommands in the region of unrest, although much ofthe physical organization of CW use lay with HusaynKamil. But none saw the Quartet as an originator ofWMD policy, nor saw themselves as promoters ofWMD.• Nuclear weapons (rather than WMD generically)were not a Quartet issue. Among the leadership,nuclear weapons as a goal appears to have beena particular priority of Saddam himself. ‘Azizbelieves Saddam was ‘fully committed to obtaininga nuclear weapon’ throughout his career, butthere is no evidence that Quartet members wereenthusiastic about a nuclear program and no hintof Saddam referring the issue to the Quartet at anystage.• Ramadan said that he, and to a lesser extent Tariq,opposed WMD in the later sanctions period becauseit created more problems than benefits. Ramadanduring UNMOVIC tried to rid Iraq of WMD, inparticular by pursuing an untrammeled accesspolicy, but alleges he was frustrated by Saddam andhis relatives.• Indeed, it was on the cost/benefit analysis of WMDin terms of Iraq’s economy and diplomatic relationsthat the most distinct policy cleavage in the Quartetemerged. Ramadan, and to a lesser extent Tariq,believed strongly that Iraq’s advantage lay in gettingrid of WMD. Such a move would lift sanctions,normalize relations with the West and then allowreassessment of how to deal with Iran. Ramadanand ‘Aziz would not have ruled out a return toWMD, but they were more focused on the outcomeof containing Iran rather than the means. ‘Ali Hasanand ‘Izzat Ibrahim were more motivated by cateringto Saddam’s views, and neither advocated any alternativethinking about WMD and containing Iran.Therefore, there was a divergence of ends versusmeans, with Saddam having a totemic attachmentto WMD despite the costs, a view not shared by allQuartet members.• The ever present danger of Iran was the mostimportant long term factor in Quartet thinking. TheQuartet thought Iraq was losing an arms race with ahostile larger neighbor. To the extent that there wassupport for WMD development among Saddam’ssubordinates, Iran was the most important driver.Those prepared to support WMD disarmament toachieve peace with the UN, would probably nothave ruled out WMD rearmament if it was necessarysubsequently to counter Iran.• There was also some acceptance of Saddam’snotion that WMD was the right of all nations andhis opposition to multilateral counterproliferation.Quartet thinking was influenced by a belief thatWMD is inseparable from industrialization and thatdual use is inevitable.Fear and Loathing in BaghdadSaddam did not trust the Quartet in a personal securitysense. Only ‘Izzat Ibrahim was allowed to drivehimself to meetings with Saddam (the others werecollected and driven in darkened limousines), thoughhis mobility seems to have been curtailed toward theend. Quartet members were physically frightened ofSaddam. Ramadan recalls a continuing fear of incarcerationand that his son-in-law was jailed for twoyears. ‘Aziz’s son Zayyid had also been jailed for aperiod. ‘Ali Hasan also was seen by his peers as fearful,despite his blood relationship and toadying.72