Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Iraq’s Use of CW in 1991 Against Internal UnrestThe former Regime also saw chemical weapons as atool to control domestic unrest, in addition to theirwar-fighting role. In March 1991, the former Regimeused multiple helicopter sorties to drop CW-fi lledbombs on rebel groups as a part of its strategy toend the revolt in the South. That the Regime wouldconsider this option with Coalition forces still operatingwithin Iraq’s boundaries demonstrates both thedire nature of the situation and the Regime’s faith in“special weapons.”• All but two of Iraq’s provinces in 1991 were inopen revolt and the Regime was worried. The fallof Karbala deeply affected key decision-makers.According to a former senior member of the CWprogram, the Regime was shaking and wantedsomething “very quick and effective” to put downthe revolt.• In the early morning of 7 March 1991 an unidentified Iraqi requested permission to use “liquids”against rebels in and around An Najaf. Regimeforces intended to use the “liquid” to defeat dug-inforces as part of a larger assault.• Husayn Kamil, then Director of MIC, orderedsenior offi cials in the chemical weapons programto ready CW for use against the revolt. His initialinstruction was to use VX. When informed that noVX was available he ordered mustard to be used.Because of its detectable persistence, however,mustard was ruled out and Sarin selected foruse.• On or about 7 March 1991, R-400 aerial bombslocated at the Tamuz Airbase were readied foruse. Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE)technicians mixed the two components of theIraqi “binary” nerve agent system inside the R-400s. Explosive burster charges were loaded intothe bombs and the weapons assembled near therunway.• Helicopters from nearby bases fl ew to Tamuz,were armed with the Sarin-laden R-400s and otherconventional ordnance. Dozens of sorties werefl own against Shi’a rebels in Karbala and the surroundingareas. A senior participant from the CWprogram estimates that 10 to 20 R-400s were used.Other reporting suggests as many as 32 R-400smay have been dropped. As of March 1991, abouta dozen MI-8 helicopters were staged at TamuzAirbase.• MI-8 helicopters were used during the Iran-Iraqwar to drop chemical munitions, according to anIraqi helicopter pilot.• Following the initial helicopter sorties, the seniorchemical weapons program offi cer overseeing theoperation received an angry call from HusaynCamel’s offi ce. The caller said the attacks had beenunsuccessful and further measures were required.The R-400s were designed for high-speed deliveryfrom higher altitude and most likely did not activateproperly when dropped from a slow-movinghelicopter.• As an alternative to the R-400s, the Al MuthannaState Establishment began fi lling CS (tear gas)into large aerial bombs. Over the next two weekshelicopters departed Tamuz Air Base loaded withCS-fi lled bombs. One participant estimated thatmore than 200 CS filled aerial bombs were used onrebel targets in and around Karbala and Najaf.• Trailers loaded with mustard-fi lled aerial bombswere also transported to the Tamuz Air Base. Aparticipant in the operation stated that mustard gaswas not used on the rebels because of the likelihoodof discovery by the Coalition. According tothe source, the mustard fi lled bombs were neverunloaded and were not used.• Reports of attacks in 1991 from refugees and Iraqimilitary deserters include descriptions of a rangeof CW and improvised poisons used in the areasaround Karbala, Najaf, Nasiriyah, as well asBasrah.Regime StrategicIntent25