Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

October 2001, Syrian technicians were dispatchedto China on Iraq’s behalf to contact influentialChinese air defense companies. Follow-on meetingswere to be held in Beijing and Damascus. AnIndian affiliated, UAE-based firm was also used asan intermediary to facilitate trade in graphite andballistic missile-related goods from Chinese firms.• In conjunction with the use of brokers and intermediaries,the IIS employed Chinese personnel as IISagents to obtain prohibited goods and build relationsbetween entities. In one case, the IIS taskedProfessor Xu Guan, a member of the Chinese highcommittee for electronic warfare to collect informationon laser-tracking systems, laser guidance systemsand information on cooperation between Iranand China. The IIS also stationed its own officers atthe Iraqi Embassy in China to manage the Iraqi-Chinese relationship and facilitate trade.and formed procurement relationships with Saddam’sRegime. These relationships could have been renewedpartnerships developed before 1991 when Francewas a major conventional arms supplier for the IraqiRegime. These procurement transactions includedoffers and contracts for conventional weaponssystems and negotiations for possible WMD-relatedmobile laboratories.Recovered documents dated December 1998 and September1999 indicate that the French company Lurasupplied a tank carrier to the Iraqi MoD. A Frenchexpert, “Mr. Claude,” arrived in Iraq in September1999 to provide training and offer technical expertiseon the carrier.By 1999, recovered documents show that multipleFrench firms displayed a willingness to supply partsfor Iraqi conventional military items, mainly relatedto aircraft.Regime Financeand ProcurementFranceThe French-Iraqi procurement relationship existedwithin a larger bi-lateral political relationship, whichwas turbulent and problematic throughout the 1990sup until OIF. From Saddam Husayn’s perspective, therelationship was built on Iraq’s hopes to influence apermanent membership on the UN Security Councilagainst the United State and UK (see the Ministry ofForeign Affairs section).• Illustrating Iraq’s persistent efforts to curry favorin Paris, France, was one of the top three countrieswith companies or individuals receiving secret oilvouchers (see the Oil Voucher section). Iraq alsoawarded numerous short-term contracts under theUN OFF program to companies in France totaling$1.78 million, approximately 14 percent of the oilallocated under the UN OFF Program.• In 2001, Tariq Aziz characterized the Frenchapproach to UN sanctions as adhering to the letterof sanctions but not the spirit. This was demonstratedby the presence of French CAs in Baghdad,working to promote the interests of French companieswhile assisting them in avoiding UN sanctions.Behind this political maneuvering, ISG has foundevidence that French companies, after 1998, sought• Documents from the Al-Hadhar Trade Company,dated November 1999, describe a delegation ofFrench companies that had participated in an InternationalExhibition in Baghdad. One of the companieswas willing to collaborate and supply spareparts for the French Mirage aircraft.• IIS documents dated from December 1999 to January2000 show that the Deputy General Manager ofa French company called SOFEMA planned to visitIraq on 15 January 2000 on behalf of a number ofFrench military companies to “seek possible tradingbetween the two countries.” An accompanying topsecret document from the GMID, M6 Section, corroboratesthis meeting and further ties the purposeto Iraqi air defense capabilities.• Another recovered letter, dated September 1999,illustrated the approval of a meeting by the GMIDM6 Section with the Head of the Iraqi-FrenchFriendship Society, Mr. William Libras. Librasoffered to supply Iraq with western manufacturedhelicopters. This was followed with a letter indicatingcontact between Al-Hadhar Trade and theFrench suppliers stating that the French companies“have the ability to update the aircraft and add anysystem you request.”111