Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

From 2000 onwards, the RG’s annual budget wasderived from the national military budget. Althoughthe mandated budget at the MoD-level fluctuatedyearly, the RG budget never exceeded 40 percentof the overall Iraqi Armed Forces budget. The SRGbudget never exceeded 10 percent of the overall RGbudget. The RG budget was Qusay’s responsibility,but the Office of the Secretariat submitted requisitionsto the Chief of Staff’s office to obtain funds for theRG.RG and SRG Procurement Process. According toKamal Mustafa, the former RG Secretary, RG commandersmet with the RG Headquarters staff twiceper fiscal year to prepare a requisition list for equipmentshortages and spare parts. This list was then forwardedto the Office of the Secretariat, via the Officeof the RG Chief of Staff for action. The SRG sentits shortage list directly to the Secretariat for inclusionin the overall RG requirements list. The Directorof the Office of the Secretariat managed the flow ofresources for the RG and SRG. He also coordinatedbudgetary matters between the RG and the rest ofthe Iraqi military community. After the Office of theSecretariat approved the procurement requirements,the MoD Directorate of Weapons and Supplies, led byStaff Major General Taleb Uwayn Juma’h, obtainedthe items in accordance with standard MoD procedures.• According to a former high-ranking MIC official,the RG and SRG had their own additionalprocurement channels after 1999 and had wideauthority to procure items on their own. Qusay’sprominent role in the RG organizations gave them apredisposition for obtaining illicit goods via Syria,according to one source.• Between 2000 and 2002, the Iraqi Governmentpurchased thousands of supply and personneltransport vehicles for the RG and SRG by theMinistry of Transportation and Communication(MoTC). Turkey, Russia, France, Germany, andSouth Korea supplied these vehicles, according to aformer senior Iraqi cabinet minister.According to captured documents and other evidencethe MoD, MIC, and its associated front companiesobtained conventional goods for the RG andSRG from Russia, Syria, and Belarus. (For moredetails on these breaches of UN sanctions see AnnexJ: The Procurement of Conventional Military Goodsin Breach of United Nations Sanctions). The RG andSRG most likely used their operational budgets topurchase common military supplies and consumablematerials. As with the rest of the MoD, the RG andSRG also benefited from other ministries purchasingdual-use goods on their behalf.After the requested equipment was delivered to Iraq,the MoD Directorate of Weapons and Supplies sentthe Office of the Secretariat an official letter notifyingthat the equipment was available. Once the goodswere delivered to the RG and deemed acceptable, theSecretariat authorized the MoO to pay the appropriateministry or commission.Military Industrialization CommissionBy the late 1990s, Iraq was eagerly trying to acquireforeign military by goods and technical expertise forits conventional military and missile programs usinga network of Iraqi front companies, some with closerelationships to high-ranking foreign governmentofficials. The billions of dollars of revenue generatedby the various protocols, illicit surcharges, andoil smuggling schemes drove the explosive growth inmilitary imports. This allowed MIC to smuggle millionsof dollars worth of military equipment into Iraqin contravention of UN sanctions.Procurement Leadership in the MICFrom its founding in 1987, the MIC was directlysubordinate to the office of the presidency. It eventuallyconsisted of 10 research companies, 36 manufacturingcompanies, eight training centers, twostand-alone units; three front companies and theheadquarters office (see Figure 39). The headquarters,located in Baghdad had two deputies and ninedirectorates: administrative and financial, commerce,research and development, projects, technical, internalmonitoring, legal, training and procurement, andthe National Monitoring Directorate. The Minister’soffice consisted of the secretary’s office, the secretcorrespondence office, the special correspondenceRegime Financeand Procurement65