Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• The Regime also sought diplomatic support for thelifting or easing sanctions by tying other countries’interests to Iraq’s through allocating contractsunder the OFF program and entering into lucrativeconstruction projects to be executed when sanctionswere lifted. In addition, Iraq held conferences torecruit and cultivate “agents of influence” to buildpressure for lifting sanctions.• Iraq negotiated a $40 billion agreement for Russianexploration of several oil fields over a 10-yearperiod. Follow-on contracts called for the constructionof a pipeline running from southern to northernIraq. Performance would start upon the liftingof sanctions. Under OFF, 32 percent of the Iraqicontracts went to Russia. The Iraqis gave preferentialtreatment to Russian companies mainly to try togain Russia’s support on the UN Security Council.The Russians, French, Ukrainians, and others succeededin reducing the amount of OFF money Iraqpaid to the UN Compensation Committee (for Gulfwar reparations) from 30 to 25 percent thus addingsignificantly to Iraq’s income stream.• The Regime sought a favorable relationship withFrance because France was influential as a permanentmember of the UN Security Council and wasin a good position to help Iraq with lifting sanctions.• Iraq awarded short term contracts under OFF tocompanies around the world. As of June 2000,French companies had contracts totaling $1.78 billion.• ‘Aziz personally awarded several individualssubstantial oil allotments. All parties understoodthat resale of the oil was to be reciprocated throughefforts to lift UN sanctions, or through oppositionto American initiatives within the Security Council.Miscalculation (2002-2003)The Miscalculation phase was marked by a seriesof poor strategic decisions that left Saddam isolatedand exposed internationally. This period was triggeredby the ill-considered reaction of the Regime—driven personally by Saddam—to the 9/11 terroristattack. This refusal to publicly condemn the terroristaction led to further international isolation andopprobrium. This was the first of several miscalculationsthat inexorably led to Operation Iraqi Freedomin 2003.Following President George W. Bush’s State of theUnion speech on 29 January 2002, senior membersof the Iraqi Government were nervous about bothIraq’s inclusion in the “Axis of Evil,” and the promisethat “the United States of America will not permitthe world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten uswith the world’s most destructive weapons.” Someministers recognized that the United States intendedto take direct unilateral action, if it perceived that itsnational security was endangered, and argued that thebest course of action was to “step forward and havea talk with the Americans.” Also concerned with theassertion of a connection between Iraq and its “terroristallies,” they felt they must “clarify” to the Americansthat “we are not with the terrorists.” Saddam’sattitude, however, toward rapprochement with theUN was well known and remained unchanged. Hehad posed to his ministers on numerous occasions thefollowing rhetorical question: “We can have sanctionswith inspectors or sanctions without inspectors; whichdo you want?” The implied answer was “we’re goingto have sanctions one way or the other for a long timebecause of the hostile attitude of the United Statesand Great Britain.”Iraqi statements on renewing cooperation with theUN varied, perhaps indicating a clash between theprivate views of some officials and Saddam’s policy.Vice President Ramadan on 10 February 2002 toldjournalists at the opening of the Syrian Products Exhibitionin Baghdad that Iraq was ready to entertain adialogue with the UN Secretary General for “return ofinternational inspectors to Iraq without any preconditions.”Four days later Iraqi Foreign Minister NajiSabri “ruled out that Iraq would send any signals tothe UN regarding its readiness to agree on the returnof international inspectors.”Dialogue, however, did begin between Iraq andthe UN. Senior-level talks occurred in March andMay 2002 at UN Headquarters in New York amongSecretary-General Kofi Annan, UNMOVIC Execu-Regime StrategicIntent61