Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

1995, and again in 1999, under orders from Ministerof Military Industrialization ‘Abd-al-Tawab‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh through his supervisor.• In 1991, however, Husayn Kamil stated to presidentialsecretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud that it was notnecessary to declare Iraq’s BW program to the UNand indicated that he would order the scientists tohide all evidence in their homes.• Initially, the Iraqi Regime’s deception strategyresponded only to the movement and actions ofthe UN inspectors. From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqismodified their tactics to continue the concealmentof proscribed materials. During the early phases ofthe inspections in 1991, UNSCOM inspectors oftengave notice of inspection sites 24 hours in advanceof movements. This gave Iraqi officials a day toremove materials, if required. The materials couldthen be returned when the inspection was complete.The continual decline led to the economic low pointof 1995 and convinced the Regime to adopt differenttactics.Recovery (1996-1998)Iraq’s economic decline forced the Regime to acceptthe UN OFF program; this resulted in economicrecovery and underpinned a more confident Regimeposture.The tightening economic sanctions, Iraq’s declarationof a BW program, the flight of Husayn Kamil,and the subsequent failure of Iraq’s attempt todisclose the “chicken farm” documents sent thenation into a downward spiral. If Saddam was goingto do something—it had to be soon. Iraq’s reluctantacceptance of UNSCR 986—the Oil-For-Foodprogram approved by the UN on 14 April 1995—andits negotiation of the formal, unchallenged tradeprotocol with Jordan set the pattern for similarillegal deals with Syria and Turkey in 2000. Thesebecame the foundation for Iraq’s economic recovery.Although initially approved by the UN in April 1995,Iraq waited until 20 May 1996 to accept UNSCR 986,and it wasn’t until December of 1996 that the actualimplementation of the program began funding thisrecovery.According to Tariq ‘Aziz, Husayn Kamil’s defectionwas the turning point in Iraqi sanctions history inthat afterwards Saddam agreed to accept OFF. Inthe early 1990s, Saddam and his advisors had failedto realize the strategic trade (and thereby political)opportunities that OFF program offered Iraq. France,Russia and China pushed Iraq to accept OFF becausethe Iraqis had consistently complained about thedeprivation sanctions had imposed on the populace(‘Aziz had repeatedly tried to get Saddam to acceptthe program during the early 1990s). In the opinionof senior Iraqi leaders, OFF allowed Iraq to rejoin theworld of international trade and its position began toimprove by 1997. ‘Aziz said Iraq began “accumulatingpartners,” life became “less difficult,” and theIraqi Government increased the amount of rationsbeing provided.Prior to the implementation of UNSCR 986, internally,the former Iraqi Regime struggled with itsKurdish enemies in northern Iraq, and used militaryforce to recapture the city of Irbil in August 1996.Coalition military retaliation appeared in the form ofDesert Strike and the subsequent extension of Iraq’sNo-Fly-Zones, further constricting Iraqi controlledairspace. Russian and France continued to chide theUnited States for, what they viewed as, US unilateralaction against the sovereignty of Iraq.Iraq’s relationship with UNSCOM remained mercurial.Early Iraqi hopes for a quick resolution of outstandinginspection issues were swallowed up in everincreasing mistrust and substantive disputes betweenthe two sides. Saddam had hoped to gain favor aftera massive turnover of WMD-related documents thatthe Regime “discovered” at Husayn Kamil’s “chickenfarm”, which validated suspicions about Iraqi concealmentoperations and raised additional questions.UNSCOM, however, became more suspicious of Iraqimotives and the relationship steadily deteriorated,despite intervention by the UN Secretary General.Eventually, the balance tipped against compliancewith inspection requirements in favor of pursuingother avenues of sanctions relief. Saddam’s decisionsin 1998 to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM48