Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

Scientific Research and Intention to ReconstituteWMDMany former Iraqi officials close to Saddameither heard him say or inferred that he intendedto resume WMD programs when sanctions werelifted. Those around him at the time do not believethat he made a decision to permanently abandonWMD programs.Saddam encouraged Iraqi officialsto preserve the nation’s scientific brain trust essentialfor WMD. Saddam told his advisors as early as1991 that he wanted to keep Iraq’s nuclear scientistsfully employed. This theme of preserving personnelresources persisted throughout the sanctions period.• Saddam’s primary concern was retaining a cadreof skilled scientists to facilitate reconstitutionof WMD programs after sanctions were lifted,according to former science advisor Ja’far Diya’Ja’far Hashim. Saddam communicated his policyin several meetings with officials from MIC,Ministry of Industry and Minerals, and the IAECin 1991-1992. Saddam instructed general directorsof Iraqi state companies and other state entities toprevent key scientists from the pre-1991 WMDprogram from leaving the country. This retention ofscientists was Iraq’s only step taken to prepare for aresumption of WMD, in Ja’far’s opinion.• Presidential secretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud wrotethat in 1991 Saddam told the scientists that theyshould “preserve plans in their minds” and “keepthe brains of Iraq’s scientists fresh.” Iraq was todestroy everything apart from knowledge, whichwould be used to reconstitute a WMD program.• Saddam wanted people to keep knowledge in theirheads rather than retain documents that could havebeen exposed, according to former Deputy PrimeMinister Tariq ‘Aziz. Nuclear scientists were toldin general terms that the program was over after1991, and Tariq ‘Aziz inferred that the scientistsunderstood that they should not keep documentsor equipment. ‘Aziz also noted that if Saddam hadthe same opportunity as he did in the 1980s, heprobably would have resumed research on nuclearweapons.• Ja’far said that Saddam stated on several occasionsthat he did not consider ballistic missiles tobe WMD and therefore Iraq should not be subjectto missile restrictions. Ja’far was unaware of anyWMD activities in Iraq after the Gulf war, but saidhe thought Saddam would reconstitute all WMDdisciplines when sanctions were lifted, althoughhe cautioned that he never heard Saddam say thisexplicitly. Several former senior Regime officialsalso contended that nuclear weapons would havebeen important—if not central—components ofSaddam’s future WMD force.• According to two senior Iraqi scientists, in 1993Husayn Kamil, then the Minister of MilitaryIndustrialization, announced in a speech to a largeaudience of WMD scientists at the Space ResearchCenter in Baghdad that WMD programs wouldresume and be expanded, when UNSCOM inspectorsleft Iraq. Husayn Kamil’s intimate relationshipwith Saddam added particular credibility to hisremarks.Reaction to SanctionsBaghdad reluctantly submitted to inspections,declaring only part of its ballistic missile and chemicalwarfare programs to the UN, but not its nuclearweapon and biological warfare programs, which itattempted to hide from inspectors. In 1991, HusaynKamil and Qusay Saddam Husayn attempted to retainIraq’s WMD and theater missile capability by usingMIC, along with the SSO, RG, SRG, and Surface-to-Surface Missile Command to conceal banned weaponsand deceive UNSCOM inspectors.• MIC organizations–the Technical Research Centerand the Al Muthanna State Establishment–dispersedIraq’s biological and chemical bombs and missilewarheads in cooperation with the Iraqi Air Forceand Surface-to-Surface Missile Command priorto Desert Storm. These undeclared or partiallydeclared weapons remained in dispersal sites, allegedly,until July 1991.44