Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

months to reach Baghdad from Bulgaria via the seaand multiple shipments by truck. An Iraqi businessmanhas confirmed that illicit equipment arriving inDamascus from Minsk, Belarus, was transferred toBaghdad via Syrian roads and railways.Open sources detail how the Habur bridge or gatenear Zakho on the border with Turkey was also ascene of illicit smuggling. The large volume of trafficacross Habur bridge (see Figure 65) hindered theadequate monitoring of cargo. Recent open sourcespoint to the fact that UN monitors were able toinspect only one in every 200 trucks that crossed intoIraq via this route.Other sources suggest that Iraq may have alsoreceived goods smuggled in by truck from Dubai viaSaudi Arabia. Illicit trade between Iraq and Iran wasalso problematic. Smuggling occurred on the roadlinking the Iraqi city of Al-Basrah and the Iranian cityof Khorramshahr. Iran exported foodstuffs, luxurygoods, and especially cement and asphalt along the40-kilometer highway. A former employee of the MICdeclared that the smuggling was under the protectionof both the Iraqi SSO and the Iranian RevolutionaryGuard Corps.There are a dozen official entry points into Iraq fromthe neighboring countries (see figure 66) of Jordan,Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, threeair entry points at Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul andtwo main ports at Umm Qasr and Al-Basrah. As indicatedon the map, the UN monitored only five bordercrossings. The primary reason for the UN’s oversightcentered on the UN OFF Program. UNSCOM weaponsinspectors seldom visited Iraq’s border controlpoints because they were based in Baghdad. The UNcontracted two private companies from 1996 to 2003(Lloyds Register and later a Swiss company calledCotecna) to authenticate and certify the arrival ofhumanitarian supplies under the UN OFF Programat three land border points. (A fourth was addedjust prior to OIF and the port of Umm Qasr (seefigure 67).This left at least two major border crossings andBaghdad’s airport completely unmonitored. Even atthe monitored crossings, cargo not approved by theUN could freely enter Iraq because UN monitors onlydealt with UN OFF cargo. Any non-UN cargo couldfreely enter Iraq at either monitored or unmonitoredentry points.Smuggling by SeaDuring the sanction years, traders used a pool ofprivate dhows, barges, and tankers to smuggle oil outand commodities into and out of Iraq’s southern portswith relative ease. It is possible that easily concealedmilitary and dual-use items could have been transportedby this method.Smuggling via Jordanian PortsThe port of Aqaba in Jordan served as a maritimetransshipment point. Beginning in the mid-1990s,Lloyds Register provided monitoring of goods arrivingat Aqaba, but Jordan terminated the contract in2000. The IIS had a representative in Aqaba, overseeingillicit trade including shipments made by a MiddleEastern firm.From 1996 to March 2001, Mohammed Al-Khatib, aJordanian businessman, became the most prominentintermediary for the Indian company NEC. Al-Khatibruns the Jordanian transport companies named MK-2000, Jordan Oil Services, and the Jordan Establishmentfor Transit, all located at the same Jordanianaddress. Al-Khatib facilitated the shipping of illicitgoods to Iraq. Contraband was shipped by PacificInternational Lines Ltd and Orgam Logistics PTE Ltdfrom India (Bombay and Madras) to Aqaba in Jordan.In all the deals:• Al-Khatib was identified as the consignee.• All voyages involved transshipment, at least one viaDubai.• Goods were unloaded at Aqaba port by Al-Khatiband reloaded onto Al-Khatib company trucks foronward transit to Iraq.• All payments by Iraq were made to Al-Khatib withAl-Khatib paying other players in the logistics andsupply chain.• Iraq submitted tenders to NEC through Al-Khatib.Regime Financeand Procurement139