Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

he may have said he had the desire, no sourcehas claimed that Saddam had an explicit strategyor program for the development or use of WMDduring the sanctions period. Given the sensitivityof the subject, however, to share such thinking withanybody but a few close associates would havebeen out of character for Saddam. This lack of aformal statement would chime with his autocraticstyle of governance—especially given past experiencewith UN inspections searching for documents.• Saddam spoke often in one-to-one sessions withfirst Husayn Kamil and later ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘AbdallahAl Mullah Huwaysh on research and industrialissues supporting WMD. There are no indicationsthat Saddam issued detailed written instructionsto either individual to direct WMD work, as wasthe practice in the 1980s when the programs werehighly active.• There are multiple references, however, to Saddamordering the MIC to pursue military technology“pet projects” he had received from other governmentagencies, individual scientists, or academics.Often the projects’ proponents had exaggeratedtheir technical merits to obtain Saddam’s backing.Desperate to find and exploit any potential militaryadvantage, Saddam would direct the projects forfurther research and development. However, noneof these projects involved WMD.Saddam’s rationale for the possession of WMDderived from a need for survival and domination.This included a mixture of individual, ethnic, andnationalistic pride as well as national securityconcerns particularly regarding Iran. Saddamwanted personal greatness, a powerful Iraq that couldproject influence on the world stage, and a successionthat guaranteed both. Saddam sought the furtherindustrialization of Iraq, held great hopes for Iraqiscience, and saw himself as the liberator of Palestine.His vision was clearest—and seemingly mostachievable—in terms of leaving Iraq militarily strong,within appropriate borders and safe from externalaggressors, especially Iran. WMD was one of themeans to these interrelated ends.Saddam felt that any country that had the technologicalability to develop WMD had an intrinsicright to do so. He saw WMD as both a symbol anda normal process of modernity. Saddam’s nationalsecurity policy demanded victory in war, deterrenceof hostile neighbors (including infiltration into Iraq),and prestige and strategic influence throughout theArab world. These concerns led Iraq to develop andmaintain WMD programs.• Saddam sought foremost personal and Regime survivalagainst several foreign and domestic enemies.At the same time, he sought to restore Iraq’sregional influence and to eliminate sanctions.• In particular, Saddam was focused on the eventualacquisition of a nuclear weapon, which Tariq ‘Azizsaid Saddam was fully committed to acquiringdespite the absence of an effective program after1991.What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successesof WMDThe former Regime viewed the four WMD areas(nuclear, chemical, biological, and missiles) differently.Differences between the views are explainedby a complex web of historical military significance,level of prestige it afforded Iraq, capability as a deterrentor a coercive tool, and technical factors such ascost and difficulty of production. We would expect tosee varying levels of attention to the four programsand varying efforts to prepare for, or engage in,actions to restart them.Saddam concluded that Iraq’s use of CW preventedIran, with its much greater population and tolerancefor casualties, from completely overrunning Iraqiforces, according to former vice president Ramadan.Iraq used CW extensively in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) to repel the Iranian army.• Iraq suffered from a quantitative imbalance betweenits conventional forces and those of Iran.• Saddam’s subordinates realized that the tactical useof WMD had beaten Iran. Even Taha Yasin Rama-24