Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

dad wanted a dialogue with the United States, andthat Iraq was in a position to be Washington’s “bestfriend in the region bar none.”While Iran was a more enduring enemy, after 1991,the temporary challenge from the United States poseda more immediate danger. Those who had detailedinformation about US capabilities also concludedthere was little Iraq could do to counter a US invasion.Iraqi military commanders who did perceive therisk of invasion realized that the imbalance in powerbetween Iraq and the United States was so disparatethat they were incapable of halting a US invasion.Even if Iraq’s military performed better during OperationIraqi Freedom, Iraq would only have increasedthe number of Coalition casualties without alteringthe war’s outcome, according to the former defenseminister.Saddam failed to understand the United States, itsinternal or foreign drivers, or what it saw as its interestsin the Gulf region. Little short of the prospectof military action would get Saddam to focus on USpolicies. He told subordinates many times that followingDesert Storm the United States had achievedall it wanted in the Gulf. He had no illusions aboutUS military or technological capabilities, althoughhe believed the United States would not invadeIraq because of exaggerated US fears of casualties.Saddam also had a more pessimistic view of theUnited States. By late 2002 Saddam had persuadedhimself, just as he did in 1991, that the United Stateswould not attack Iraq because it already had achievedits objectives of establishing a military presence in theregion, according to detainee interviews.• Saddam speculated that the United States wouldinstead seek to avoid casualties and, if Iraq wasattacked at all, the campaign would resemble DesertFox.• Some Iraqi leaders did not consider the UnitedStates to be a long-term enemy, but many knewlittle about the United States and less about its foreignpolicy formulation. Former advisors have alsosuggested that Saddam never concluded that theUnited States would attempt to overthrow him withan invasion.Iraq’s Limited Intelligence on US MilitaryOperationsIraq derived much of its understanding of US militarycapabilities from television and the Internet, accordingto the former DGMI director. Iraq obtained onlylimited information about US military capabilitiesfrom its own intelligence assets, although they closelymonitored the US buildup in Kuwait.• The army staff prepared a comprehensive study onhow US attacks against Iraq might unfold in 2002,according to captured documents. The assessmentevaluated the size, composition, and probable dispositionof US forces and identified the US aircraftcarriers immediately available to attack Iraq.• The DGMI provided the Higher Military College anassessment about how the US XVIII Airborne Corpsmight attack Iraq, according to captured documents.The Al Bakr University was using this informationin computer modeling and war gaming.• Iraq collected reliable tactical intelligence againstUS forces in Kuwait and even knew when OperationIraqi Freedom would start, according to a formerfi eld-grade Republican Guard offi cer. One senioroffi cer spotlighted how important the Internet wasto their understanding of general threat capabilities.Saddam, however, portrayed the United States andIsrael as inseparable and believed Israel could notattack Iraq without permission from the UnitedStates. In February 2001, Saddam stated in a televisionbroadcast, “The United States and Israel are onething now . . . the rulers of the United States havebecome a toy in the hands of the Zionist octopus,which has created the midget Zionist entity at theexpense of Arabs in occupied Palestine.” In May ofthe same year he stated, “We will draw the swordagainst whoever attacks us and chop off his head.”Saddam directed the Iraqi media “to highlight themotive of the covetous [US] leadership that succumbsto the wishes of Zionism” and “seeks to establish anartificial homeland at the Arabs’ expense.” Ramadannoted that the Regime considered Israel to be anextension of the danger posed by the United States.32