Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)eventually led to UNSCOM’s departure and a Coalitionmilitary attack against Iraq, Desert Fox.Saddam later regarded the air strikes associated withDesert Fox in December 1998 as the worst he couldexpect from Western military pressure. He noted,but was less influenced by, the limits of internationaltolerance shown in the UNSC to his hard-line againstUNSCOM. He over-estimated what he could, infuture, expect from Russia, France and China in theUNC in terms of constraining a more vigorous Coalitionresponse.• Iraq accepted OFF in May 1996 and oil beganto flow in December 1996; revenues from thisprogram gradually increased to $5.11 billionannually in 1998 (see the Regime Finance andProcurement chapter).• Saddam distrusted OFF because he felt it wouldrelieve international pressure on the UNSC toexpeditiously lift sanctions. For the same reason, herefused in September 1991 to acknowledge UNSCR712, to garner international support by claimingthat sanctions were starving the Iraqi people.Impact of the “Chicken Farm” Documents• Huwaysh, in 1997 ordered his employees to signstatements certifying they did not have any WMDrelateddocuments or equipment. The penalty fornon-compliance was death. His scientists relinquishedrooms full of documents, which MICturned over to the National Monitoring Directorate.Huwaysh was unsure what the NMD ultimately didwith them.Although Iraq’s release of the “chicken farm” documentsinitially created a more positive atmospherewith UNSCOM, the relationship grew strained asUNSCOM and the IAEA inspections became moreaggressive. The release destroyed the internationalcommunity’s confidence in the credibility of followonIraqi declarations of cooperation. UNSCOMconcluded that it had been successfully deceivedby Iraq and that the deception effort was controlledand orchestrated by the highest levels of the formerRegime. UNSCOM therefore directed its efforts atfacilities associated with very senior members of theRegime and designed inspections to uncover documentsrather than weapons. The situation eventuallyreached an impasse then escalated to crisis andconflict. From this experience, Iraq learned to equatecooperation with UNSCOM with increased scrutiny,prolonged sanctions, and the threat of war. Inresponse, Baghdad sought relief via a weakening ofthe sanctions regime rather than compliance with it.Regime StrategicIntentThe release of long-concealed WMD documentationplanted at Husayn Kamil’s farm in August 1995, andIraq’s declarations in February 1996 revealing newaspects of the WMD programs were major turningpoints in the Regime’s denial and deception effortsfollowing the Desert Storm. Iraq considered the declarationto be a measure of goodwill and cooperationwith the UN; however, the release of these documentsvalidated UNSCOM concerns about ongoingconcealment and created additional questions fromthe international community. In an attempt to complywith UN requirements:• The Iraqi leadership required WMD scientists tosign an agreement in 1996 indicating that theywould turn over any WMD documents in theirhouses and that failure to do so could lead to execution,according to reporting.Looking Ahead to Resume WMD ProgramsThe Regime made a token effort to comply with thedisarmament process, but the Iraqis never intendedto meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions. Outwardacts of compliance belied a covert desire toresume WMD activities. Several senior officials alsoeither inferred or heard Saddam say that he reservedthe right to resume WMD research after sanctions.• Presidential secretary ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud, whilea detainee, wrote: “If the sanctions would have beenlifted and there is no UN monitoring, then it waspossible for Saddam to continue his WMD activitiesand in my estimation it would have been donein a total secrecy and [with] concealment becausehe gained from 1991 and UN decisions.” But inanother debrief, Huwaysh said it would take 6months to reconstitute a mustard program.49