Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

dan, one of Saddam’s more independent-mindedunderlings, acknowledged that the use of CW savedIraq during ground fighting in the Iran-Iraq war.• Saddam announced at the end of the war that theIranian army’s backbone had been shattered by thewar, according to the presidential secretary. Saddamstated that Iran would be unable to confront Iraq fora decade. Political divisions in Iran, weaknesses inIranian military capabilities, and Iran’s inability tosustain long-term offensive operations also reducedthe risk of attack, according to the former chief-ofstaff.• Hamid Yusif Hammadi, former Secretary of thePresident and presidential office director (1982-1991), said that after the Iran-Iraq War, Saddamwas intoxicated with conceit. He believed he wasunbeatable. He spoke of this to the Iraqi Governmentofficials and to visiting dignitaries from otherArab countries.”Saddam concluded that missile strikes on Tehran,late in the Iran-Iraq war, along with the Al Fawground offensive had forced Iran to agree to acease-fire, according to the former Minister of MilitaryIndustrialization.• Saddam’s logic was that the “war of the cities”—when Al Husayn missiles were fired at Iranian targetsfrom February to April 1988—had shown thatTehran was more vulnerable to missiles becauseits population density was greater than Baghdad’s.This gave Iraq a strategic incentive to maintain ballistic-missilecapabilities.• According to Saddam, Iraq accelerated its missiledevelopment after Iran demonstrated the rangecapability of its imported ballistic missiles in the1980s. Saddam said missile technology had beenimportant to Iraq because Iraq could build its ownballistic missiles whereas Iran could not.Saddam saw Iraq’s nuclear program as a logicalresult of scientific and technical progress and wasunconvinced by the notion of non-proliferation. Heconsidered nuclear programs a symbol of a modernnation, indicative of technological progress, a byproductof economic development, and essential topolitical freedom at the international level (what hedescribed as “strategic balance”). He wanted nuclearweapons to guarantee his legacy and to compete withpowerful and antagonistic neighbors; to him, nuclearweapons were necessary for Iraq to survive. Saddamwished to keep the IAEC active and his scientistsemployed and continuing their research. “I,” maintainedSaddam, “am the Godfather of the IAEC andI love the IAEC.” In a captured audio tape, Saddamsaid in a conversation (of unknown date) with Tariq‘Aziz and other unidentified senior officials:This conversation was very useful. We have had alook at the international situation, and arrange (presenttense) our present and future steps during thesestudies. I believe that the USA is concentrating on theFar East, and all of the areas of South East Asia, fortwo main reasons—Korea and Pakistan. The existenceof the nuclear weapons in other countries makesthe USA and Europe get worried. Having nuclearweapons in these areas, with their economic situationknown by the US, gives these countries a chanceto face the European countries and the Americans. Along time ago economic recovery existed in only intwo areas of the world. In the last fi fteen years Japanappears to have improved itself to what they seenow. Not only Japan but all of these countries havedeveloped economically. When it appears that thereare nuclear weapons in Korea others will be allowed,under the doctrine of “self defense and balance ofpower,” to create the same industry. As a result, whenSouth Korea or Japan decides to create nuclearweapons they won’t need a long time to produce it.The money and the weapons will be in an area outsideEurope and the USA. At the same time there will bemore pressure on China to stop their [South Korea orJapan’s] nuclear experiments. When nuclear centersare allowed in different places this pressure willdecrease, and China will have the chance to developits nuclear programs with less pressure from USAand Europe. As a result, as it was previously withChina, with the high technology, will put the USA andEurope in the situation we mentioned before: they willbe worried about their international trading and theirinternational effect. This is what the USA isinterested in.26