Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

directly and continuously to him. Husayn Kamil createdthe first MIC in 1987, which continued in variousforms—including a major overhaul in 1992—untilhis flight to Jordan in 1995. ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘AbdallahAl Mullah Huwaysh restructured the organization in1997 into its second form, which remained until theonset of Operation Iraqi Freedom.Both Husayn Kamil and ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘AbdallahAl Mullah Huwaysh represent partial anomalies inSaddam’s command and control structure. Saddamwas interested in their loyalty, discretion and abilityto achieve results. The assets they commandedwere not threats to his rule in the way the army orthe Ba’th Party could be. Both Husayn Kamil andHuwaysh were therefore given more license and lessdirect oversight than the army leadership or the RCC,although Saddam would often ask about particularprojects or facilities. Ironically, in Husayn Kamil’scase, this lack of oversight eventually created majorproblems for the Regime.• When Husayn Kamil assumed responsibilityfor military scientific research adn industry in1987, Saddam gave him broad administrative andfinancial authority to consolidate Iraq’s research,development, and industrial resources into militarycapabilities essential for winning the Iran-Iraq war.Husayn Kamil had notable successes, developinglong-range missiles and BW and CW capabilitiesfor Saddam. In the aftermath of Desert Storm,Husayn Kamil used MIC in attempts to concealbanned weapons and deceive UNSCOM inspectors.His capricious and self-serving leadership of MICand lack of accountability eventually destroyed itsinstitutional integrity, a process further aggravatedby his departure in 1995.• By 1997, MIC was on the verge of collapse. TheMinistry of Defense, MIC’s primary customer,had lost confidence in its ability to meet militaryproduction requirements. To halt the slide, Saddamplucked ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al MullahHuwaysh from nine years of bureaucratic exile, andinstalled him as the Minister of Military Industrialization.Huwaysh instituted strict organizational andfinancial reforms, centered on mandatory planningand personnel accountability. By 2002, MIC wasthriving, its total revenues increasing over fortyfold as had its revenue base, despite continuing UNsanctions and coalition attacks on its facilities.The Military Industrialization CommissionAs an institution, the MIC had historical continuityemerging in the 1980s from the State Organization forTechnical Industries (SOTI) as the “Military IndustrializationOrganization,” progressing through theMinistry of Industry and Military Industrialization(MIMI), and fi nally in 1991, transforming into theMIC.The MIC ran Iraq’s military-industrial complex,including at certain times, all weaponization ofchemical and biological agents and delivery systems.Iraq’s nuclear program, however, was separate fromMIC’s institutional framework through much of itshistory. Operation Desert Storm destroyed much ofIraq’s military-industrial infrastructure, includingmany chemical bombs and rockets. But, despite thewar, some of Iraq’s WMD arsenal remained intact,and was preserved by the MIC. The MIC assistedin concealing banned weapons and attempting todeceive the UN weapon inspectors up until 1995,when Husayn Kamil Hasan Al Majid, Saddam’sson-in-law and MIC director, fl ed to Jordan (see the“Husayn Kamil” text box for additional information).By 1997, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) hadlost faith in the ability of the MIC to develop orproduce the goods required of it. Re-creation of theMIC began in 1997 under Huwaysh, who by 1999 hadreorganized and completely restructured the organization.Saddam’s growing confi dence in Huwayshsaw him eventually appointed as the Minister ofMilitary Industrialization and, later, as one of theDeputy Prime Ministers of Iraq. The MIC’s reemergenceprovided the research, development andindustrial base upon which Saddam hoped to rebuildand modernize Iraq’s military-industrial capabilities.Huwaysh introduced mandatory planning, financialoversight and personal accountability in order to setthe organization on a modern accountable managementbase. Salaries were raised and re-engagementwith the MoD took place. Universities were encouragedto contribute to MIC projects and research,while production was outsourced to the private sector,with considerable success.Regime StrategicIntent17