Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

this to the international community, especially Iran.Barring a direct approach to fulfillment of the requirementsof 687, Iraq was left with an end-run strategyfocusing on the de facto elimination of sanctionsrather than the formal and open Security Councilprocess.• In the late 1990s, Saddam realized he had no WMDcapabilities but his ego prevented him from publiclyacknowledging that the Iraqi WMD programwas ineffective, according to the former Ministerof Higher Education and Scientific ResearchHumam ‘Abd-al-Khaliq ‘Abd-al-Ghafur. He addedthat Saddam never talked openly about bluffing inregard to WMD.Efforts To Lift SanctionsAs part of his efforts to escape sanctions, Saddamlaunched a vigorous campaign to shape internationalopinion. The Regime drew attention to everythingfrom poor sanitation to the absence of electricpower; the main effort, however, focused on theimpact of sanctions upon children, especially thoseunder five years of age. Sanctions did indeed have anenormous impact upon Iraq, and Saddam’s campaignutilized and amplified that impact. The campaigneventually involved everyone from ministers of theIraqi Government to journalists around the world,humanitarian groups, and UN officials.• The London Observer amplified a BBC2 documentarywhich aired in 2002 and exposed Saddam’stactics. “Small coffins, decorated with grislyphotographs of dead babies and their ages—’threedays’, ‘four days’, written useful for the Englishspeakingmedia—are paraded through the streets ofBaghdad on the roofs of taxis, the procession led bya throng of professional mourners.” There is onlyone problem, the program observes: because thereare not enough dead babies around, the Regimeprevents parents from burying infants immediately,as is the Muslim tradition, to create more powerfulpropaganda. An Iraqi taxi driver interviewed on theprogram observed, “They would collect bodies ofchildren who had died months before and been heldfor mass processions.” A Western source visited anBuying Your Way OutAs a way of generating international support, theRegime gave to others an economic stake in theRegime’s survival; an example of this is the curiouscash disbursement to a senior member of RussianIntelligence.According to ‘Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab AlNasiri, the Secretary of the President, Tariq ‘Azizand the Iraqi Ambassador to Russia, ‘Abbas AlKunfadhi, arranged the payment of 15-20 millionUSD to a female colonel in the Russian IntelligenceService. She wanted ‘Aziz to accommodate thecompanies nominated by the Russian Intelligence.Saddam was approached with this issue by ‘Azizduring or after the Council of Ministers’ meeting.Later, Saddam called ‘Abd and told him to expecta call from Tariq ‘Aziz to authorize the paymentand channel it through Muhib ‘Abd-al-Razzaq, thedirector of the accounting offi ce of the PresidentialDiwan. The payments were made in installmentsrather than a lump-sum over every six monthsstarting on or about 20 September 2002.Iraqi hospital and, in the absence of his “minder,”was shown “a number of dead babies, lying stackedin a mortuary, waiting for the next official procession.”Saddam used Iraq’s oil resources, in what Baghdadperceived to be a moderately successful attempt, toundermine and remove UN sanctions. Iraq’s provenoil reserves are assessed to be second only to thoseof Saudi Arabia, with estimates ranging from 90.8 to147.8 billion barrels (the most common is 112.5 billionbarrels). The former Regime played its “oil card”in two distinct ways: first, Saddam either stopped orreduced oil exports to increase upward pressure onworld oil prices. Iraq successfully used this tacticfrom November 1999 through the spring 2000.Second, Saddam attempted to link the interests ofother nations with those of Iraq through the allocationof OFF oil and trade contracts, which were grantedto companies whose governments were willing toexercise their influence within the Security Council tolift sanctions. This effort also included the award ofoil contracts to individuals and groups willing to useRegime StrategicIntent35